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Abstract
How do international trade and economic integration alter competitive 
pressures in economies? Can economic integration increase welfare by alle­
viating factor market distortions? What are the precise channels through 
which trade triggers welfare gains?
This thesis examines how economic integration can alter competitive pres­
sures in both product and factor markets. Endogenising product market 
imperfections, the new trade theory highlighted a number of previously un­
recognised sources of gains from trade. This thesis will suggest that further 
gains from trade can be derived by endogenising factor market imperfections. 
Although these gains have been commonly alleged to by practitioners, they 
have hardly been formalised.
Chapter 2 empirically assesses the importance of the various channels 
through which procompetitive gains from trade may be attained. Using a 
panel of 2400 Mexican firms between 1984-1990, it is shown that markups fell 
with trade liberalisation. It is also suggested that liberalisation has increased 
total factor productivity of the firms in the sample.
The remainder of the thesis is of a theoretical nature. Chapter 3 focuses 
on the market for intermediate inputs in the presence of hold-up. In a closed 
economy, a bilateral monopoly is operating and inefficiencies arise in both 
product and factor markets. As the economy opens up to trade, procompet­
itive effects suppress the margin between prices and marginal costs increas­
ing allocative efficiency. If downstream firms become internationally mobile, 
productive gains may arise from increasing returns to scale and intensified 
competition in the input market.
Chapter 4 focuses on the unionised labour market. If countries are sym­
metric, trade will increase competition in the product market raising labour 
demand. The effect on wages is ambiguous. If firms are internationally 
mobile, the threat of firm mobility reduces both wages and unemployment.
When a society is rich, it s people don’t need to work with their 
hands; they can devote themselves to activities of the spirit. We 
have more and more universities and more and more students. 
If students are going to earn degrees, they’ve got to come up 
with dissertation topics. And since dissertations can be written 
about everything under the sun, the number of topics is infinite. 
Sheets of paper covered with words pile up in archives sadder than 
cemeteries, because no one ever visits them, not even on All Souls’ 
Day. Culture is perishing in overproduction, in an avalanche of 
words, in the madness of quantity. That’s why one banned book 
in your former country [Czechoslovakia] means infinitely more 
than the billions of words spewed out by our universities.
Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, 1984.
Chapter 1 
Introduction
Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of 
one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one 
animal by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is 
mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776.
The theory of international trade forms one of the earliest areas of the in­
quiry into the nature and causes of wealth. Yet, at the close of the twentieth 
century, the study of international trade theory is as dynamic as ever. Great 
names such as David Ricardo, Eli Heckscher, Bertil Ohlin and Paul Krug- 
man have all made invaluable contributions in identifying the motivations 
behind and consequences of international economic transactions between na­
tions. Nonetheless, many unanswered questions continue to challenge trade 
theorists and policy makers alike.
In this introduction we will argue that the persistent emergence of new 
problems in trade theory can be intricately linked to changes in the interna­
tional economic environment. To provide some context and motivation for 
the present study, this chapter starts with a very brief sampling of some of 
the existing literature (sections 1.1-1.3). The discussion centres around three 
different paradigms: the classical models, factor market distortions and the
1
new trade theory.1 The development of each of these is analysed in light 
of real world trade flows as observed by the modelers at the time of their 
research. It is argued that models, which may now be criticised for their lim­
itations, once provided great insight into the basic motivations behind trade. 
This leads us to the objective of the present study in section 1.4. Dramatic 
changes are presently taking place in the international environment. Once 
again, this obviously calls for a reconsideration of previously derived results 
and possibly even for the development of a new paradigm. Postponing other 
questions for future work, this thesis focuses primarily on gains from trade 
in this new environment. Section 1.5 outlines the dissertation.
1.1 The Classical Models
It is probably fair to say that the formal analysis of international trade was 
started with the theory of comparative advantage. Although the concept 
has definitely stood the test of time, it can also claim to be one of the most 
commonly misinterpreted ideas in economics. It is simple and profound, yet 
ingenious, and it even has some direct practical implications. In its more 
succinct form, it states that trade is welfare improving whenever the relative 
productivities of industries diverge internationally.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can now argue that Ricardo’s insights 
fit into a much wider theoretical framework than his simple examples first
1 Paradigms were patented in 1962 by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Sci­
entific Revolutions. A paradigm can be defined as the current dominant vision 
and according to Kuhn has two essential characteristics: (i) its achievement is 
sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from 
competing modes of scientific activity; and (ii) it is sufficiently open-ended to leave 
all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve. [77, p. 10] 
Kuhn argues that as a prerequisite for the existence of science one needs researchers 
that uncritically accept the existing paradigm and work on points of detail within 
it as well as those who provide the more revolutionary paradigms.
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suggested.2 Ricardo worked with the assumption of two goods and one factor 
of production. By altering the number of goods and factors, we can view 
all the perfectly competitive trade models that have arisen since as special 
cases of a more general standard trade model.3 For instance, two goods 
and two factors generates Heckscher-Ohlin, whereas two goods and three 
factors yields the Ricardo-Viner model. In this framework, inferences about 
more complicated higher dimensional models also become relatively straight­
forward.
Trade data from the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when much 
of the above work was developed, suggest that trade flows were indeed based 
on differences between countries.4 Before 1913, the direction of world trade 
was dominated by Europe’s ever growing demand for food stuffs and raw 
materials. These were supplied by the colonies in exchange for manufacturing 
goods. It was a flourishing business! Whereas world output per head grew 
at an average rate of 7.3 per cent per decade between 1800 and 1913, per 
capita world trade averaged a growth rate of 33 per cent per decade over the 
same period [67, ch.5]. Between 1876 and 1913 the volume of export trade 
in primary products trebled. The spread of industrialisation also increased 
trade in manufactures and the share of primary products in world trade 
remained virtually constant, fluctuating between 60 and 65 per cent.
2The development of comparative advantage is generally attributed to Ricardo. 
Thweatt [125] notes that Robert Torrens expressed it already two years earlier, 
in his 1815 Essay on the External Com Trade. Torrens also suggests that James 
Mill deserves credit for publicising the idea. Without Mill, it would not have been 
included in the Principles of Political Economy [109].
3Unlike the later framework, Ricardo’s model of comparative advantage as­
sumed diverging international technologies. In the absence of this assumption, no 
unique pattern of trade can be generated for the Ricardian case of one factor of 
production and two goods.
4These differences are both attributed to (i) diverging international technologies 
as in the Ricardian model and (ii) differing factor endowments as in the Heckscher- 
Ohlin model.
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With the onset of the first world war, international trade collapsed.5 It 
was not until the end of the second world war that trade flows slowly began 
to recover.6 As Europe lay in ruins and many of the former colonies gained 
independence, a completely fresh start was made. Forces more powerful than 
factor endowments took command of trade patterns in this new era. In the 
second half of this century it became increasingly clear that, although com­
parative advantage was still a decisive step in unraveling the motivations 
behind international trade, it was no longer exhaustive. The gradual transi­
tion of the literature, away from the classical model, is sampled below.
1.2 Factor Market Distortions
One of the first to criticise the standard model and its implications was 
Gottfried Haberler [49]. In a much celebrated paper, he wrote
Everybody knows, of course, that it [the classical model] is 
an idealised case which is never completely realised in actual 
practice. There are many types of frictions and deviations from 
the ideal conditions [“distortions”] caused by monopolistic and 
oligopolistic imperfections of the market, external economies and 
diseconomies, price and wage rigidities, lack of information...etc.
Each of these conditions may operate in such a way as to make 
certain deviations from the free-trade policy rational on purely 
economic ground.
The Economic Journal, 1950, p.227.
5In the interwar period, the diminishing trade hypothesis took root. It pro­
posed that the decline in the volume of trade between nations was a byproduct 
of increasing industrialisation and technological progress. Proponents of the hy­
pothesis argued for instance that technological progress involved the substitution 
away from the use of raw materials, thereby reducing the demand for interna­
tional trade. In addition, they also suggested that the spread of industrialisation 
and the diffusion of knowledge across international borders would do away with 
any existing comparative advantages.
6It actually took until the mid-1970s for international trade as a share of world 
GDP to recover to its 1913 level.
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He proceeded to develop one of the earliest formal economic argument 
against free trade.7 Incorporating market imperfections into the analysis of 
international trade, this paper marked a turning point in the development 
of trade theory. Over the next twenty years, a very large literature was to 
emerge on trade policy in distorted markets. It would derive that in the 
presence of a wide variety of factor market imperfections, trade policy could 
serve as a second best instrument to remedy domestic market distortions. 
Magee in his 1973 article Factor Market Distortions, Production and Trade: 
A Survey cites as many as 162 references [88]. Unfortunately, the literature is 
somewhat eclectic and a comprehensive summary would call for a long listing 
of alternative factor market imperfections. The interested reader should refer 
to Bhagwati [5] who synthesises much of the work in his Generalised Theory 
of Distortions and Welfare.
The work on factor market imperfections was mostly motivated by prob­
lems relating to the emergence of the third world. This is not surprising. 
Between 1955 and 1960, the developed world experienced an annual increase 
in real GNP per head of 10 per cent. The comparable figure for developing 
countries was only 4 per cent. While the rich were getting richer, the poor 
were losing out more and more [114, ch.6]. The problems of the third world 
were becoming increasingly clear in the late fifties. Both in theoretical work 
and in the actual experience of developing countries, the notion of trade as 
an engine of growth began to be seriously questioned. It was generally be­
lieved that the classical Heckscher-Ohlin model, characterised by smoothly 
functioning markets, was not appropriate in guiding trade policy for devel­
oping countries.8 The unequivocal adherence to free trade was challenged in 
academic circles and beyond. It was shown over and again that, under factor
7In line with the literature, I refer to economic arguments as those that recom­
mend protection as a means of increasing aggregate welfare rather than achieving 
some non-economic objective.
8See for instance Myint’s exposition [99].
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market imperfections, trade policy can be used as a second-best remedy. The 
hegemony of the frictionless classical models had ended.
1.3 Distortions in The New Trade Theory
In the 1960s, the classical models began to face a second challenge. This time 
around it came from the industrialised world. Since the second world war, the 
largest and fastest growing component of international trade had been the 
exchange of manufacturing goods between countries in the developed world. 
This became particularly clear when economists analysed the consequences 
of the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s. 
Both Verdoorn [132] and Balassa [1] found that trade in Europe was becoming 
increasingly an exchange of similar goods. Grubel and Lloyd [48] estimated 
that 71 per cent of the increase in trade in the EEC between 1959 and 1967 
was of an intra-industry nature. Initially it was suggested that this could 
be explained by product heterogeneity within aggregates. However, after 
Grubel and Lloyd [48] found significant intra-industry trade for Australia at 
the seven-digit level, the search for a model where product differentiation 
and economies of scale served as an independent motive for trade was on.
In trying to explain the problems of the third world, most researchers 
thought it was sufficient to relax some of the assumptions of the classical 
model. Incorporating factor market distortions into the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model enabled the formal illustration of real world phenomena. It turned 
out that the identification of two-way trade was calling for something more 
drastic: a second standard trade model.
It is worth pointing out that the importance of increasing to scale in 
explaining trade patterns had been recognised for quite some time. For 
instance, while developing the factor endowment model, Bertil Ohlin [105] 
pointed out that
6
Most regions would be forced to produce a great many articles 
on a small scale if they imported nothing from abroad. If manu­
factured for small home markets only, cash register apparatus, dye 
stuffs, complicated machines, tools and many other things could 
be had only at considerable higher cost than at present, when 
they are produced for the world market. Clearly, the economies 
of large-scale production make interregional division of labour 
profitable, irrespective of differences in the prices of the factors 
of production. In other words, the advantages of specialisation 
resulting from large-scale production lead to interregional trade. 
Commodities which can be produced very cheaply in huge fac­
tories or in large groups of factories, and which when located 
together reap benefits from external economies, are spread over 
large markets, each factory or group of factories being sufficient 
to satisfy the demand of a large number of consumers. On the 
other hand, commodities which can be produced with the same 
or greater efficiency in small establishments, e.g. made-to-order 
clothing, will generally not travel very far; they will be produced 
where they are in demand, even if the demand in each region 
be comparatively small. The former kind of articles will figure 
prominently in interregional trade, but not the latter.
Interregional and International Trade, 1933.
The long dominance of the constant returns to scale models is therefore 
to be attributed to modeling complexities involving multiple equilibria and 
indeterminacies. Krugman [74] writes in 1987 ‘the attempt to formalise trade 
based on increasing returns seemed until recently to lead to an impenetrable 
jungle of complexity’.
The earliest attempt at incorporating increasing returns to scale adopted 
the Marshallian approach, where returns to scale are assumed to be external 
to the firm, allowing perfect competition to remain. This work dates back 
as far as Matthews [92] and was continued by for instance Melvin [94] and 
Kemp and Negishi [66]. It is fair to say that this literature enjoyed only 
limited success until a key innovation by Ethier [37] led to a breakthrough in 
1982. This enabled the first synthesis of the Marshallian increasing returns 
to scale and the comparative advantage approaches.9
9Unlike all the previous literature, Ethier [36, 37] works from the allocation of
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More relevant to the present study is a second approach, which emerged 
around 1980. It had been recognised for a long time that if one were to relax 
the assumption of constant returns, the issue of market structure had to be 
addressed. Due to breakthroughs in industrial organisation and game theory, 
this suddenly became possible. Two independent developments can be distin­
guished. First, Spence [123] and Dixit and Stiglitz [31] revived Chamberlin’s 
large group analysis of competition between similar firms producing differ­
entiated products with increasing returns at the level of the firm. This was 
applied to international trade by Krugman [71, 73], Helpman [56], Ethier [38] 
and Dixit and Norman [30] and has turned out to be a particularly flexible 
and insightful model.10 The second development consisted of an applica­
tion of the Bertrand/Cournot oligopoly models to international trade. This 
became the basis for much of the work in the strategic trade policy literature.
Through the application of the Chamberlinian model of monopolistic 
competition and the Bertrand/Cournot approaches to oligopoly, new tools 
were provided to think about a variety of issues in international trade. Armed 
with these new tools, a group of economists embarked on a rejuvenated effort 
to attempt to answer the most basic question in international trade: What 
can be gained? This research agenda is now known as the new trade theory.
Gains from trade in this new literature can be roughly subdivided into 
three categories. First, gains can be attained through the exploitation of in­
creasing returns. In the Chamberlinian model, the effect of trade on the scale 
of production depends on the elasticity of demand for individual varieties. If 
trade increases the elasticity of demand facing each firm - which is plausi­
ble since the number of varieties available in the market has increased - the 
scale of production of each firm will expand.11 The exploitation of increasing
resources to production and trade rather than the other way around.
10An alternative approach by Lancaster [78] is also quite widely used.
n Due to the increase in the elasticity of demand, firms will lower their markup 
over production costs. To continue to break even, they will then need to increase
8
returns to scale then raises welfare levels.12
Second, the new trade theory also identified gains from trade brought 
about by an expansion in the number of varieties available to consumers. 
Krugman [72] and Dixit and Norman [30] demonstrate that gains arise as 
international trade enables consumers to expand the number of horizontally 
differentiated varieties included in their consumption bundle.13
Of crucial importance to the present work is a strand of the literature 
that examines the potential gains from trade resulting from a third source: 
increased product market competition. Although this idea can by no means 
be attributed to the new trade theory, this literature does deserve credit 
for developing a more insightful formal analysis of the issue. Notable is the 
work by Krugman [71], which introduces a procompetitive effect from trade 
into the Chamberlinian large group model mentioned above. International 
trade then suppresses price-marginal cost margins and gains from trade are 
observed as product market imperfections reduce. Dixit and Norman [30] 
suggested that trade may not only reduce allocative inefficiencies, but it 
may also improve technical efficiency. In their model, the trade-induced 
increase in competition drives some firms out of the industry as lower prices 
no longer enable them to cover costs. With a smaller number of firms in 
equilibrium, increasing returns can be exploited to a greater extent thus 
promoting productive efficiency.14
their scale of operation.
12The gains from trade through the exploitation of economies of scale are also 
commonly analysed in models of perfect competition and homogeneous prod­
ucts with increasing returns at the level of the industry. This includes work by 
Melvin [94], Markusen and Melvin [91] and Ethier [36, 37].
13In a tangential literature, Gabszewicz et al. [43] have derived further gains 
from trade when products are vertically differentiated. They demonstrate that 
competition between rival producers can reduce the prices of higher quality goods 
to the point where lower quality goods are driven out off the market.
14The procompetitive effect of trade can also be found in the reciprocal dumping 
models of Brander [17] and Brander and Krugman [18].
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Whereas in 1913, 20 per cent of UK imports consisted of manufactures, 
by 1992 this share had risen to almost 80 per cent. Throughout the sec­
ond half of the twentieth century, it became increasingly clear that observed 
trade flows were inconsistent with the theoretical structure of comparative 
advantage and the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Developments in the theory of in­
dustrial organisation and in game theory fostered the development of the new 
trade theory. Endogenising product market imperfections, new motives for 
international trade were identified. Combining these with the factor endow­
ments model enabled international trade theorists to explain more accurately 
trade flows between countries.
1.4 Objective of this Study
The new trade theory thus identified three further sources of gains from 
trade. Welfare gains arise from: (i) the exploitation of increasing returns 
to scale; (ii) the expansion of the number of available varieties; and (iii) 
the procompetitive effect that trade exerts on the product market. With 
increased liberalisation, many academic economists and practitioners believe 
that this third source of gains from trade is particularly important. However, 
attempts to empirically assess these gains have so far been limited. The first 
objective of the present study is to begin to resolve this cleft. To address 
the impact of trade liberalisation on firm behaviour, this study uses a large 
plant-level data set. The data cover approximately 80 per cent of Mexican 
industry from 1984-1990, a period of intense (mostly unilateral) trade liber­
alisation. Questions asked include: Does trade-induced competition impose 
a procompetitive discipline on producers? Does trade liberalisation suppress 
the markups that firms charge over marginal costs? What are the precise 
mechanisms that bring about welfare gains? Do increased trade flows affect 
total factor productivity growth?
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Endogenising product market imperfections was central to the new trade 
theory. However, economists have long recognised the importance of factor 
market imperfections. One of the criticisms of the early literature in the 
1950s and 1960s was that the distortions modeled were assumed, rather than 
derived.15 In other words, the factor market imperfections were exogenous. 
As an illustration, Magee [86, 87], Bhagwati and Srinivasan [8] considered a 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin model in which a factor in one of the two sectors 
earned a proportional premium, over and above the return to the same factor 
in the other sector. They proceeded to show that this assumption threw 
doubt on almost all standard predictions regarding gains from trade and 
their distribution.16 Harris and Todaro [51] considered a fairly similar set­
up, but narrowed the analysis down to the labour market. They introduced 
a politically determined minimum urban wage which was assumed to be 
substantially higher than the agricultural wage. In such a dual labour market 
structure, they showed that trade policy could serve as a second best policy 
to remedy the domestic distortions.
The second aim of this study is to assess the analytical possibility and 
the practical benefits of endogenising factor market imperfections. With 
the tools provided by the new trade theory as well as recent developments 
in other areas of economics, it is argued that factor market distortions can 
now be modeled in a less ad-hoc fashion. In particular, we will apply ideas 
from the new Keynesian macroeconomics and from the incomplete contract­
ing literature to the study of international economic integration. Questions 
addressed include: In the presence of factor market distortions, what is the 
impact of the increased product market competition on factor markets? If 
trade reduces price-marginal cost markups, what can be inferred about factor
15See for instance Jones and Neary [63].
16In later work Neary [101] suggested that the researchers had identified un­
stable equilibria, thus calling into question the validity of their propositions and 
strengthening the Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
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market payments? Is there a potential for further gains from trade as the 
factor market is disciplined?
Initial trade models tried to motivate trade between countries that dif­
fered in some respects. Then, in response to changing trade patterns, the new 
trade theory endogenised product market imperfections and was thus able to 
motivate trade between similar countries. However, further drastic changes 
are presently taking place in the international economic environment. Most 
importantly, between 1983 and 1990 global foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows rose by an annual average of 30 per cent. This thesis will therefore not 
only evaluate the welfare impact of international trade, it will also examine 
the consequences of firm mobility. A third aim of this thesis is to determine 
whether firm relocation and FDI can provoke any further efficiency gains. 
Will increased competition in the input market raise global welfare?
It has been suggested throughout this introduction that the formal study 
of international trade is closely linked with developments in the international 
economic system. The most recent changes include (i) the surge in FDI and 
in particular in vertical FDI, i.e. the vertical disaggregation of the produc­
tion process, (ii) the emergence of low-wage competition from the newly 
industrialising economies and (iii) rapid technological progress which low­
ers transportation and communication costs thereby increasing the degree 
of international competition. The most ambitious and long run aim of this 
research is to see whether endogenising factor market imperfections can pro­
vide some insight into the motivations behind these recent developments in 
international economic relations.
1.5 Organisation of this Study
Chapter 2 is of an empirical nature. It attempts to assess the importance 
of the various channels through which gains from economic integration may
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be attained. We concentrate on the opening of the Mexican economy in the 
period 1984-1990. In 1985, the economy was still following a protectionist 
trade policy. Average tariffs exceeding 30 per cent and import licenses were 
required for 94 per cent of all goods produced domestically. By 1989, the av­
erage tariff on a production weights basis was 15 per cent and import licenses 
were only required for 12 per cent of domestic production. Furthermore, ne­
gotiations to enter a free trade area with the United States had started. We 
use a unique panel data set of almost 2300 firms. We measure productive 
efficiency by estimating total factor productivity (TFP) coefficients using a 
translog production function. Between 1988 and 1990 we find that for the 
economy as a whole, TFP grows on average by 8 per cent a year. Moreover, 
the increase in TFP is several times as rapid as the increase in GDP over the 
same period. Using our estimates of TFP, we then use a variant of the Hall 
method to estimate changes in markups. For the economy as a whole, we 
find that before 1988 firms charged prices that exceeded marginal costs by 
an average of 35 per cent. After the onset of trade liberalisation, markups 
dropped by 11 percentage points to 1.24.
The second part of chapter 2 attempts to link the changes in markups and 
TFP growth with measures of international competition. Most of the results 
confirm to the predictions of trade theory. Tariffs and the degree of openness 
are found to be statistically significant in explaining the changes in markups. 
It is also shown that the concentration ratio of an industry, as expressed by 
the Herfindahl index, is statistically significant in explaining markups. The 
final finding in chapter 2 is that trade liberalisation has increased the rate of 
productivity growth of the firms in the data set. One complicating factor in 
the analysis is that the period of Mexican trade liberalisation coincides with 
its recovery from a deep recession. Unfortunately, we were unable to control 
for the effects of this recession.
Chapter 2 strongly suggests an empirical link between trade liberalisa­
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tion, markups and the efficiency of firms. This information provides some 
empirical justification for our theoretical analysis of factor market imperfec­
tions and economic integration presented in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
We concentrate on distortions in two particular factor markets: intermediate 
inputs and labour. In both cases, agents are assumed to be engaged in longer 
term relationships and distortions will result as agents have market power 
and bargain over the rents to be shared. When agents are involved in longer 
term relationships, efficiency issues surrounding the bargaining game in the 
factor market have been highlighted by recent research in incomplete con­
tracting theory. When circumstances (such as transaction costs, bounded 
rationality or implementation problems) prevent a complete contract from 
being written in stage 1, the agents will have to bargain over residual in­
come streams in stage 2. The literature has mostly focused on how potential 
inefficiencies can be reduced or even removed by adopting a particular owner­
ship structure or allowing contract renegotiation. The analysis in this thesis 
instead examines how international trade and firm mobility may affect the 
payoffs of the bargaining game, including its disagreement point. Chapters 3 
and 4 will show that both allocative and productive efficiency improvements 
may then be realised, generating additional gains from trade.
Chapter 3 focuses on the effects of economic integration in the presence 
of incomplete contracting inefficiencies when countries are symmetric in all 
respects. In line with much of the recent literature, we focus on a particular 
type of incentive problem common when agents make a relationship spe­
cific investment. Under autarky, we have one upstream and one downstream 
firm and the upstream firm makes a relationship-specific investment. This 
is shown to lead to hold-up, as the investor is ex post exposed to oppor­
tunism. In the presence of bargaining, it cannot capture the full return to its 
investment.17 Since the downstream firm is a monopoly in the product mar­
17This argument was first formalised by Grout [47], building on arguments con-
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ket, we identify both allocative and productive inefficiencies under autarky. 
As the economy opens up to international trade of the downstream good, pro- 
competitive effects in the product market suppress the margin between prices 
and marginal costs increasing allocative efficiency. As long as the upstream 
good is nontradable, the bargaining game in the input market is unaffected 
and all productive inefficiencies are preserved. If downstream firms become 
internationally mobile, productive gains may arise from increasing returns to 
scale and intensified competition in the input market. It is briefly discussed 
when relocation of one of the downstream firms is likely to be the equilibrium 
outcome. The chapter then concludes with a discussion of the distribution 
of the welfare gains.
In the fourth chapter we change focus to the labour market. To match the 
institutional context of Western European economies, we assume bargaining 
between unions and oligopolistic employers when countries are symmetric in 
all respects. A similar hold-up story can then be told. In the absence of 
binding contracts, the union will first signal a low wage to promote capital 
investment by the firm. Once the capital stock has been installed, the union 
will demand a higher wage in the next period. Since the firm is unable to 
capture the full returns to its investment, its optimal strategy will be to un­
derinvest in the first stage. It can then be shown that capital mobility of the 
firm will increase its bargaining power and thus reduce hold-up and under­
investment. Economic integration once again results in productive efficiency 
gains.
The formal analysis presented in chapter 4 is aimed to capture a slightly 
different, yet further source of gains from trade. By assuming that capital in­
vestments are sunk, we circumvent any efficiency effects outlined in the para­
graph above. We employ a framework of new Keynesian macroeconomics, 
which incorporates the microeconomic foundations of imperfectly competi-
tained in Williamson [134] and Klein, Crawford and Alchian [69].
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tive labour and product markets into a macroeconomic framework primarily 
aimed at studying unemployment. As a result of the market power of firms 
and the bargaining power of unions, we identify both allocative and produc­
tive inefficiencies under autarky. If the economy opens up to international 
trade, product market competition will increase since more varieties have 
become available. This will suppress price marginal cost markups thereby 
alleviating allocative inefficiencies. Furthermore, as the firm now has fewer 
rents to share, the bargained wage also falls. More workers are hired and 
the reduction in allocative inefficiencies therefore indirectly triggers smaller 
productive inefficiencies.
Chapter 4 then proceeds to consider the impact of the threat of foreign 
direct investment. It is shown that, if firms are internationally mobile, the 
threat of firm mobility effectively increases the bargaining power of the firm. 
This reduces both wage levels and unemployment. Since countries are sym­
metric in all respects, it is the threat of FDI that invokes the increase in 
wage pressure. Even in the absence of any relocation, the ‘outside option’ 
effectively increases the bargaining power of the firm thus suppressing wages 
and increasing employment, aggregate output and net welfare. Although 
the above analysis assumes that any factor market imperfections are to be 
attributed to unions, the first section of the chapter could easily be manip­
ulated to show that the results extend to other recent theories of imperfect 
labour markets, such as the efficiency wage theory.
Chapter 5 summarises and concludes. It considers to what extent this 
dissertation has successfully addressed its objective and suggests some direc­
tions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Trade Liberalisation, Markups 
and Productivity: The Mexican 
Case
Trade should be free, even in Hell.
Dutch saying
2.1 Introduction
On December 17, 1992, Mexico, Canada and the USA signed the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In addition to bringing consid­
erable trade liberalisation in services and agriculture, it was also intended to 
reinforce the gains made during the late eighties in opening up Mexican in­
dustry to foreign competition. Since 1947, shortly after the start of Mexico’s 
industrial expansion, successive governments had instituted increasingly pro­
tective trade policies.1 With the exception of the Mexico-US border region, 
where separate trade policies were maintained, government intervention in 
Mexican trade continued to be extensive until the mid 1980s. In 1985, the
*For a more detailed description of the development of Mexican trade policy 
during the twentieth century, refer to King [68] or Reynolds [108].
17
average tariff was 31 per cent and import licenses were required for 94 per 
cent of goods produced in all industries. In the same year, the government 
announced the abrupt ending of the Mexican experience as a closed econ­
omy. By 1988, the government had completely abolished export controls. 
The average tariff was cut to 15 per cent and import licenses were now only 
required for 12 per cent of national production. The opening of the Mexican 
economy has by all means been dramatic.
However, the analysis of the Mexican trade opening is of wider interest. 
As multilateral trade liberalisation has slowed down, bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) and trading blocs are becoming an increasingly popular 
means to capture gains from economic integration. Not only are these agree­
ments GATT legal, but they are also considered compatible with the long- 
run aim of multilateral trade liberalisation. NAFTA is particularly unique 
in that it is the first FTA between partners of drastically different sizes and 
levels of economic development. Its experience will have implications for the 
formation and implementation of further FTAs worldwide.
In assessing NAFTA and other FTAs, the magnitude and mechanism of 
the gains from trade and integration needs to be analysed. This is particu­
larly important since there is such a large discrepancy between the academic 
literature on the one hand and the beliefs of most practitioners on the other. 
Academics have long argued that trade and economic integration induce a 
range of static efficiency gains, including the exploitation of economies of scale 
and international differences in factor endowments and technology. Practi­
tioners on the other hand tend to emphasise the importance of dynamic 
welfare gains from trade and international capital mobility. The empirical 
measurement of these dynamic welfare gains is still in its infancy.2
2 A small number of recent studies suggest that the debate is still largely unre­
solved. See for instance Bhagwati [6], Nishimizu and Page [104], Pack [107] and 
Tybout [127].
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This paper aims to shed some light on the magnitude and mechanisms of 
welfare gains resulting from the opening of the Mexican economy in the late 
1980s. The next section briefly outlines the data set. Section 2.3 estimates 
total factor productivity of manufacturing firms in the Mexican economy. 
Section 2.4 estimates markups both before and after trade liberalisation. The 
second half of the paper tries to link the findings on productivity growth 
and markups to changes in trade policy. Section 2.5 briefly outlines the 
evolution of Mexican trade policy between 1984 and 1990. Section 2.6 tries 
to establish a link between trade policy and changes in markups. Section 2.7 
examines whether there is any evidence that trade liberalisation has increased 
productivity growth. Finally, section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Data
The data set consists of a balanced panel of 2393 firms over a 7 year period 
(1984-90). Firms are assigned to one of roughly 200 industries at the level of 
the Mexican census classification. The survey data cover the largest plants 
that produce on average 80 per cent of the output of each industry.
For each firm we have observations on 69 variables. These observations 
can be subdivided into three categories. The first category covers the tech­
nological structure of the firm. It contains data on firms’ inputs and outputs, 
including production, sales, intermediate inputs, purchases of white and blue 
collar labour and the capital stock. Since these data are in current pesos, 
we deflated the capital stock by the price index for investment goods. Other 
input and output data were deflated by the sectoral price indices.3 The sec­
ond type of data consists of firms’ location and ownership information. The 
latter takes the form of the percentage of equity owned by nationals of Mex­
3These sectoral indices are at the ‘Rama’ level, which aggregates the 200-sector 
Mexican census classification up to 48 industries.
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ico, USA and five other countries. We assign firms to being foreign owned 
whenever more than 50 per cent of their equity is non-Mexican.4 The third 
and final type of data concerns openness. In particular, we have sectoral in­
formation on the average annual import tariff and the percentage of product 
lines in the industry subject to import licenses. These trade openness data 
will allow us to track the evolution of trade policy over the 7 year period and 
to link it with the performance of firms. A more complete description of the 
data is provided in the data appendix at the end of this chapter.
2.3 Total Factor Productivity
2.3.1 Estim ating the Translog Production Function
To estimate total factor productivity, we employ a general form transcenden­
tal logarithmic production function, expressing the logarithm of output as a 
generalised quadratic function of the logarithms of inputs. The translog pro­
duction function has become widely used since its inception by Christensen, 
Jorgenson and Lau [25]. Since it allows second-order approximations to ar­
bitrary technologies, it is much more flexible than either a Cobb-Douglas or 
a CES specification.
The translog specification for a plant p in industry c in period t is 
In VApc/t =  Ac/t +  £  a,- In%  +  \  £  £ bjk In Xj( In , (2.3.1)
3 Z 3 k
where VA is value added, A represents the logarithm of total factor pro­
ductivity (TFP) and XJ is input j. Subscript p indexes the 2082 plants, c 
indexes the 200 industries, f shows whether the firm is under foreign or Mex­
ican ownership and t denotes the years from 1984 to 1990. The three inputs
4Since most firms in the data set are either fully Mexican or fully foreign owned, 
this cut-off at 50 per cent is quite robust.
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employed are blue collar labour (BCL), white collar labour (WCL) and capi­
tal (K). BCL and WCL are expressed in terms of the number of hours worked 
by blue collar and white collar labour respectively. To control for changes in 
the price level, the capital stock is deflated by the investment price index and 
VA is deflated by sectoral price indices. ept is the plant-specific disturbance 
term. Note that 2.3.1 presupposes that the coefficients on inputs are the 
same for all firms in the economy. 5
We impose the following decomposition on the technology element
-A-c/t =  C +  Tf +  Qft +  tc , (2.3.2)
where C is a constant, rt is a time-specific productivity shock and Qft denotes 
an interactive time-ownership specific constant. This is designed to capture 
potential productivity differences between foreign and Mexican firms over 
time and allows us to investigate whether any catch-up has taken place.6 
Productivity shocks at the industry level are captured by ic, the industry 
specific constant.7
Some implications of the specification of the model should be highlighted. 
First, since the factor inputs enter the translog production function logarith­
mically, their coefficients are simply the elasticities of output with respect to 
each of the inputs. In contrast, the coefficients on the various components of
5We will relax this assumption later in the paper.
6Blomstrom and Wolff [11] suggest that the presence of foreign firms in an 
industry generates a number of spillovers. In their analysis of Mexican industry, 
they find that the productivity levels of Mexican firms gradually converge to those 
of their foreign counterparts.
7Tybout and Westbrook [129] and Tybout, de Melo and Corbo [128] have de­
composed the change in total factor productivity into changes due to scale effi­
ciency and those due to technical efficiency. They find that improvements in scale 
efficiency are not associated with increased openness. However, they do find a 
positive correlation between the exposure to foreign competition and the technical 
efficiency level of firms. Here, we do not pursue such a decomposition.
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the technology term enter linearly and are therefore to be interpreted as per­
centage changes. To keep the specification of the model as parsimonious as 
possible, potential interactions between factor inputs and time or nationality 
dummy variables have been restricted to zero.
Some Estimation Issues
Although the translog production and cost functions have been used widely, 
their application to panel data sets is less common.8 Since there are unob­
servable industry-specific effects, estimating the translog production function 
using standard ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques would yield biased 
estimates whenever any of the explanatory variables is correlated with the 
industry-specific effects. To reduce this problem, we used fixed and random 
effects at the level of the industry.9 In the case of fixed effects, all variables 
are redefined as deviations from the mean for each of the 2 0 0  industrial sec­
tors. OLS is then performed using the deviations, a procedure known as the 
within-groups estimator. The random effect (GLS) estimator is a weighted 
average produced by the between and within estimators. Since the data set 
is biased towards the inclusion of larger firms, we consider the fixed effect 
model to be more appropriate.
Because of collinearity between interaction terms and other variables it 
is often difficult to estimate the parameters with precision. It is therefore 
not uncommon to estimate the translog function jointly with the factor de­
8The first application to a panel data set is to be attributed to Caves, Chris­
tensen and Trethaway [23]. Using a fixed effect model, they analysed the returns 
to scale and the returns to density in US trunk and local service airlines. An alter­
native approach based on random effects is used by Caves, Christensen, Trethaway 
and Windle [24] in modeling rail transportation services.
Alternatively we could have employed fixed and random effects at the level of 
the firm. However, we consider the loss of degree of freedoms in doing so too large. 
Furthermore, estimating so many dummies may aggravate the multicollinearity 
problem inherent in estimating a single equation translog production function.
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mand equations. Using cross-equation constraints, efficiency gains may be 
attained. However, as highlighted by for instance Tybout [126], factor de­
mand equations are difficult to specify properly and are likely to introduce 
significant biases. 10 We do not pursue this approach.
Finally, since the translog production function is quadratic we have to a 
posteriori ensure that it is well-behaved, i.e. that output increases monoton- 
ically with all inputs and that the function is convex. It can be shown that 
monotonicity holds whenever each input’s share of total output is positive. 
Convexity of the translog function requires that its bordered Hessian must be 
negative semidefinite. 11 Both these conditions will be checked a posteriori.
Empirical Results
The results of the estimation of the translog production function 2.3.1 are 
given in table 2.1. For completeness and comparison, we also report the 
estimates of the Cobb-Douglas production function. F-tests show that the 
translog form explains significantly more of the variation in both the fixed and 
random effects models. 12 In addition to the more traditional arguments, the 
fact that large plants in the data set are consistently more capital intensive 
than small plants goes some way in explaining this. 13
10Using Chilean industrial census data, Tybout [126] strongly rejects the cross- 
equational restrictions commonly employed in estimating the translog function 
jointly with the factor demand equations.
11A clear discussion of the translog production function and its regularity prop­
erties can be found in Chung [26, ch. 12].
12The F-statistic with 6 numerator and 14147 denominator degrees of freedom 
is 44.85 and 44.79 for the fixed and random effects models respectively. Since the 
critical value is 2.80, the null hypothesis that the two regressions are equal can be 
rejected at the 1 per cent level.
13Using a very similar data set, Tybout and Westbrook [129] suggest that this 
fact is inconsistent with the Cobb-Douglas specification but that second-order 
approximations to arbitrary technologies are flexible enough to capture the depen­
dence of returns to scale on size.
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Table 2.1: Production Function Estimates
Regression Random Effects Fixed Effects
Translog Cobb-Douglas Translog Cobb-Douglas
K 0.0862 0.1821 0.0882 0.1832
(0.0218) (0.0053) (0.0217) (0.0053)
BCL 0.4581 0.5115 0.4539 0.5057
(0.0422) (0 .0 1 0 2 ) (0.0421) (0 .0 1 0 1 )
WCL 0.6933 0.3949 0.6960 0.3983
(0.0362) (0.0092) (0.0361) (0.0091)
K2 0.0286 0.0292
(0.0049) (0.0049)
BCL2 0.1408 0.1426
(0.0153) (0.0152)
WCL2 0.1132 0.1148
(0.0119) (0.0119)
K/BCL -0 .0 1 1 1 -0 .0 1 2 0
(0.0066) (0.0066)
K/WCL 0.0009 0 .0 0 1 1
(0.0061) (0.0062)
BCL/WCL -0.1472 -0.1486
(0.0107) (0.0107)
T85 0.0091 0.0098 0.0092 0 .0 1 0 0
(0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0247)
T 8 6 -0.0675 -0.0675 -0.0678 -0.0679
(0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0247)
T87 -0.0963 -0.0983 -0.0966 -0.0987
(0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0248)
T8 8 -0.1706 -0.1737 -0.1708 -0.1741
(0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0247)
T89 -0.0401 -0.0437 -0.0402 -0.0439
(0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0247)
T90 0.0417 0.0362 0.0417 0.0360
(0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0247)
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Table 2.1: Production Function Estimates (Cont’d)
Regression Random Effects Fixed Effects
Translog Cobb-Douglas Translog Cobb-Douglas
F84 0.2732 0.2956 0.2788 0.3015
(0.0468) (0.0472) (0.0468) (0.0472)
F85 0.2742 0.2879 0.2801 0.2939
(0.0469) (0.0473) (0.0469) (0.0473)
F8 6 0.2877 0.3126 0.2935 0.3187
(0.0468) (0.0472) (0.0468) (0.0472)
F87 0.2681 0.2989 0.2735 0.3047
(0.0469) (0.0472) (0.0468) (0.0472)
F8 8 0.3084 0.3417 0.3138 0.3476
(0.0468) (0.0472) (0.0468) (0.0472)
F89 0.2875 0.3160 0.2930 0.3220
(0.0471) (0.0474) (0.0470) (0.0474)
F90 0.2761 0.3023 .0.2818 0.3084
(0.0471) (0.0475) (0.0471) (0.0475)
Constant -0.2537 0.0800 -0.2026 0.1399
(0.0836) (0.0374) (0.0919) (0.0550)
R2 0.774 0.767 0.774 0.767
Number of observations (Nobs): 14297 
Standard errors in brackets.
Table 2 .1  shows that all the factor inputs have the expected sign and 
are highly significant. It can be inferred from the estimation of the translog 
production function that the shares of the various factors in the production 
process are 0.19 for capital, 0.41 for white collar workers and 0.50 for blue col­
lar workers in both the fixed and random effect models. 14 The shares in the
14This can be obtained by differentiating the logarithm of value added with 
respect to the logarithms of each of the three inputs.
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Cobb-Douglas specification follow directly from the coefficients on K, BCL 
and WCL and are not too dissimilar from the translog estimates. The coeffi­
cients suggest that as a whole Mexican industries employ blue collar labour 
relatively intensively, followed by white collar labour and capital. Adding 
up the shares, the estimates in table 2 .1  suggest that returns to scale axe 
approximately 1.10. F-tests confirm that we can reject the constant returns 
to scale hypothesis at the 1 per cent level for all 4 estimations.
Turning to the next set of estimates, the time dummies show that between 
1984 and 1990 there was only a 4 per cent increase in productivity. 15 Until 
1988, productivity was falling with the level being 17 per cent lower in 1988 
than it was in 1984. In the final 2 years, the time dummies show that 
productivity increased very rapidly to generate a net increase by 1990.
The interactive time foreign-ownership dummies show that firms under 
foreign ownership axe consistently more productive than firms under Mexican 
ownership. Depending on the year and the estimation procedure, foreign 
firms are 27 to 35 per cent more productive than Mexican firms. 16 In each of 
the 4 estimations, the productivity gap increases in the middle of the period 
and then returns to approximately its 1984 level. This may be attributed to 
the fact that foreign firms axe less recession prone than Mexican firms.
To ensure regularity of the translog production function we checked that 
the monotonicity and convexity conditions held. A posteriori we found that 
fitted shares from the translog estimates are positive for all but one of the 
white collar labour observations. Furthermore, after omitting this observa­
tion, we found that the bordered Hessians are negative semi-definite at every 
data point. We therefore conclude that our estimated translog production
15F-tests show that we can reject the hypothesis that the time dummies can be 
dropped at the 1 per cent level.
16Unsurprisingly, formal F-tests show that we can reject the hypothesis that the 
interactive time foreign ownership dummies can be dropped at the 1 per cent level 
for all specifications in all years.
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function is well-behaved.
Finally, we performed a Hausman test based on the difference between 
the within and GLS estimators. For the translog specification, the test yields 
a x 2-value of 40.91. This is distributed as X22 under the null and it is not 
significant at the 5 per cent level. We are therefore unable to reject the hy­
pothesis of no correlation between the individual effects and the explanatory 
variables. 17 This leads us to discard any endogeneity problems that would 
require the use of instrumental variables.
Using the estimates in table 2.1, we calculated total factor productivity 
estimates for all firms.18 Using value added as a weight, estimates for the 
manufacturing sector as a whole are presented in figure 2.1. Figure 2.2 dis­
aggregates the TFP estimates by ownership. These data do therefore not 
support the catch-up hypothesis as put forward by for instance Blomstrom 
and Wolff [11].
Disaggregating the Analysis
The analysis so far has assumed common input coefficients for all indus­
tries. We tested whether or not this is a justifiable restriction by inserting 
multiplicative industry-dummies on the first order factor input terms of the 
translog production function. We initially disaggregated the sample into 48 
different industries (the Rama level) and found that the hypothesis that all 
industries had the same input coefficients could not be rejected at the 5 per 
cent level. We proceeded to experiment with various other levels of indus­
trial disaggregation and investigated the impact on the significance level of 
the multiplicative dummies. We eventually decided that a disaggregation of
17If the coefficients of the fixed and random effect models differed signifi­
cantly,this would have implied that the random effects are correlated with the 
regressors or that the model was misspecified.
18Recall that total factor productivity is given by the exponential of A.
the data into 13 industrial sectors was most appropriate. First, whereas fur­
ther disaggregation produced hardly any significant dummies, at this level of 
aggregation roughly 70 per cent of the multiplicative dummies were signifi­
cant. Furthermore, the disaggregation employed here is comparable to other 
work done in this area. 19
For each of the 13 sectors, we estimated the translog production func­
tion 2.3.1. We then calculated total factor productivity for each of the 13 
sectors over the sample period.20 The results are graphed in figure 2.3. The 
disaggregated TFP estimates show that the trends in most sectors conform 
to the aggregate picture. Before 1988, total factor productivity generally 
declined. This was followed by a rapid pick-up after 1988. The percentage 
growth rate for all firms in each industry between 1988 and 1990 is given in 
table 2.2. This table shows that TFP growth over this period is positive for 
all 13 industrial sectors. Moreover the weighted average growth rate of the 
13 sectors, using value added shares, is an astonishing 24.18 per cent over 
the three year period. The increase in TFP is several times as rapid as the 
increase in GDP over the same period.
Although the trends in most sectors are very similar, some deviations de­
serve highlighting. First, the only sectors that experience no decline in TFP 
over the entire period are automobiles and transportation equipment. Figure 
2.3 also shows that the TFP evolution of food, beverages and machinery is 
somewhat anomalous. In section 2.7 we will use these sectoral differences 
in productivity growth and we will try to formally link them to (sectoral) 
changes in trade policy.
19 See for instance Harrison [52] and Levinsohn [84].
20Recall that TFP is given by exp Apcft. For sake of tractability and compactness, 
we will restrict ourselves to presenting those results that are of direct relevance 
to the issues in this paper. The complete estimations of the translog production 
function can be obtained from the authors.
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Table 2.2: Percentage Growth Rates by Sector
Number Sector TFP Growth 
1988-90 (%)
1 Food 16.33
2 Beverages 16.90
3 Textiles 23.47
4 Wood and Paper Products 21.05
5 Chemicals 26.00
6 Metals 21.24
7 Machinery 32.78
8 Tobacco 20.56
9 Leather 21.17
1 0 Cement 39.22
11 Plastic Products 46.89
1 2 Automobiles 19.52
13 Transportation Equipment 29.57
2.4 Estim ating Markups
In this section we identify the price marginal cost margins of the firms in the 
sample. Since marginal costs cannot be directly measured from the usual 
firm or industry data, we estimate marginal costs using a variant of a method 
first suggested by Hall [50].21 Levinsohn [84] and Harrison [52] precede the 
present study in applying the method to panel data sets of firms in developing 
countries facing trade liberalisation.22 The essence of the Hall method is to
21 See also Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen [32]. A clear overview of the method 
and the recent literature is provided by Feenstra [41].
22Levinsohn [84] considers the 1984 trade liberalisation in Turkey, while Harri­
son [52] considers the 1985 trade reform in the Ivory Coast. Earlier work by Melo 
and Urata [93] compares reported price cost margins for two census years before 
and after the Chilean trade reforms of the 1970s. Research on developed country 
data is reviewed by Schmalensee [115].
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measure marginal cost as the observed change in cost as output rises or falls 
from one year to the next. For our purposes, one of its assets is that it em­
ploys the same data as the measurement of total factor productivity growth 
presented in the previous section. We diverge from the existing literature in 
that we use explicit estimates of total factor productivity growth.
2.4.1 The Hall M ethod
Recall the production function
VApcft =  Q'pcftF(BCLpcft, WCLpCft, KpCft) , (2.4.1)
where a pcft =  exp(Apcft) is given by 2.3.2. It enters multiplicatively to cap­
ture the idea that the change in output is not independent of the level of 
inputs. Estimates of all components of this production function were ob­
tained in the previous section and are presented in table 2 .1 .
To estimate price cost margins we totally differentiate the production 
function and obtain
A  V A p c f t  —  OLpcft * ABCLpc/ ( +  A W C L^t|ABCLpc/( dW CLpc/t
I d  Fpcft A Tvr
+  T "r7------a  r^pcft
where A is the first difference operator defined by Axpcft =  xpcft — xpcft_i.23 
Assuming that firms profit maximise with respect to output and all three 
inputs, we can link production to preferences and the markup charged by 
each firm. As shown by Levinsohn [84], substituting the four first order 
conditions into the total differential 2.4.2 yields
23It should be noted that the approximation in 2.4.2 is best when returns to 
scale are close to one.
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A V  APcft ^-Qpcft^pcft Ppcft 5 ^ a b c W  + ^ w ^ a w c w
p t p t
I rpcft 
p t
AKpcft (2.4.3)
where BCW is the blue collar wage rate, WCW is the white collar wage rate, 
r denotes the rental rate of capital and p* is the sectoral price index.24 ppcf t 
represents the unobservable estimate of the price cost margin and reflects the 
market share, the elasticity of demand and the mode of market conduct.25
The question of particular interest in this study is whether trade liberal­
isation has had an impact on marginal cost markups. Although the policy 
prescriptions of many of the models composing the new trade theory liter­
ature axe not always in agreement, the implications of trade liberalisation 
on price marginal cost margins is strikingly uniform: in almost every model, 
a tariff or a quota increases price cost markup.26 In what follows, we will 
assume that the shift in trade policy that gave rise to trade liberalisation 
took place in 1988.27 We estimate the following equation
AVApcft AoipcftFpcft —
g CWg£g A BCLpe/t +  WCVV / «AWCL +  W £ AK
P t P t Pi
Ppcft
7  D*
pcft +
BCWpc/t ABCL^ ( +  w e w , ^ AW +  w AKj)c/( (2.4.4)
P* Pi Pi
where D* is 0 during the first four years of the sampling period and equals 1
24These have been constructed at the ‘Rama’ level, a subdivision of the data set 
into 48 industries.
25See Levinsohn [84] for a more detailed exposition.
26See for instance Helpman and Krugman [57] for an overview.
27Although both licensing requirements and tariffs were scaled back a bit earlier 
than that, a sharp real devaluation of the peso softened the initial impact of the 
changes in trade policy.
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after 1987. If trade liberalisation has a negative impact on price cost margins 
than 7  will be negative.
2.4.2 Estim ating Markups
The literature so far has chosen to restrict the technological shock in some 
way and then to estimate productivity shocks and markups simultaneously. 
For instance, Harrison [52] decomposed productivity change into (i) an indus­
try specific component captured by a constant term and (ii) a plant specific 
component consisting of a plant specific constant and a random disturbance 
term. Levinsohn [84] restricted the productivity shock to follow a random 
walk, where the unexpected component was assumed to be comprised of (i) 
an economy-wide shock to variable factors only indexed by time and (ii) a 
shock independent of the marginal productivity of variable inputs. The lat­
ter is both time and plant specific and is assumed to be orthogonal to the 
economy-wide shock.
The present analysis diverges from the existing literature in that we em­
ploy the technology estimates of the translog production functions obtained 
in the previous section and therefore only estimate the markup.28 Substitut­
ing the production function estimates into the left-hand side of 2.4.4 gives 
us a revised measure of output, which has been adjusted to take into ac­
count the effects of productivity change. Having controlled for technological 
change, we are now able to estimate markups directly.
Many of the econometric concerns raised in the literature have been re­
solved by the use of the technology estimates from the translog production 
function. One remaining issue is the imposition of prior identifying restric­
tions on the markup (5. In 2.4.4, the markup is indexed by both plant and 
period, implying negative degrees of freedom. The most common approach
28We use the coefficients from the fixed effects models.
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is to assume that all firms have the same markup. 29 We experimented with 
a variety of models. We first employed fixed and random effects at the plant 
and industry levels. We then grouped the firms into 6  size groups and re­
peated the estimations. Finally, we differentiated the firms by nationality of 
ownership. The differences in estimated coefficients in all these cases were 
minimal. The results are reported in the appendix at the end of this chapter. 
In line with the literature, we proceed here by assuming that little infor­
mation is lost by assuming that all firms charge the same markup and we 
therefore estimate equation 2.4.4 using standard OLS. As before, we first 
consider all industries in our estimation and then disaggregate the sample 
into 13 different sectors. Whereas the aggregated estimation of 2.4.4 uses the 
technology estimates produced by the aggregate production function (table 
2 .1 ), the disaggregated markup regressions employ the technology estimates 
from the disaggregated sectoral translog production functions.
2.4.3 Empirical Results
The results of the OLS estimation of the aggregate markup equation are 
presented in table 2.3. Since we have no data on the cost of capital, we 
estimate the model for£=2.5%,r^=5% and r=7.5% .30 For all 3 estimations, 
the standard errors are relatively'small in cJrhparison to the estimates which 
leads us to conclude that the markups are quite precisely estimated. All 
coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level.
29 See for instance Hall [50], Levinsohn [84] and Harrison [52], Levinsohn [84] 
emphasises that this is in contrast with the underlying theory which implies that 
larger firms act more competitively than smaller firms.
30Even if we raise the cost of capital to 20 per cent, the qualitative results do 
not change. Levinsohn [84] has noted the same feature in his study of the Turkish 
trade liberalisation of the mid-eighties. He suggests that this may be attributed 
to the fact that investment as a share of output is relatively small.
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Table 2.3: The Aggregate Markup Equation
Regression I II III
0 1.35 1.35 1.34
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
1 -0 .1 1 -0 .1 1 -0 .1 1
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93
r(%) 2.5 5 7.5
Number of Observations: 12492
If prices were equal to marginal costs, 0  would be unity. Table 2.3 sug­
gests that prices are significantly different from marginal costs in all the 
estimations. We used F-tests to formally show that the null hypothesis that 
(3 = 1  can be rejected at the 1 per cent level in all three cases. Table 2.3 
shows that, before 1988 firms charged prices that exceeded marginal costs by 
an average of 35 per cent. After 1987, markups dropped by 1 1  percentage 
points to 1.24.
It should be reiterated that the regressions in table 2.3 presuppose that 
the input shares of the factors of production are identical for all sectors. 
Allowing for differences in factor intensity between sectors and using the 
sectoral technology estimates produces price cost markups as presented in 
table 2.4. These estimations assume that^r=5%.
Table 2.4 shows that the markups take a reasonable value for all 13 in­
dustries, generally lying between 1 and 2. The change in markups after 1987 
is negative for 8  of the 13 industries. This provides some further evidence 
for the idea that competitiveness increased and markups fell over the second 
part of the sample period.
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Table 2.4: Sectoral Markup Equations
Number Sector P 7 R2 Nobs.
1 Food 1.27 0.17 0.702 1884
2 Beverages 2 .1 2 -0.30 0.678 504
3 Textiles 1 .8 6 -0.29 0.715 1698
4 Wood and Paper Products 1 .1 2 0.08 0.690 1356
5 Chemicals 1.26 -0.05 0.553 2664
6 Metals 1.33 -0.13 0.771 1434
7 Machinery 1.33 -0 .1 0 0.979 882
8 Tobacco 1.31 0.31 0.907 318
9 Leather 1.82 -0 .2 2 0.701 72
1 0 Cement 1 .0 0 0.14 0.378 810
11 Plastic Products 1.09 0.28 0.856 372
1 2 Automobiles 1.82 -0.25 0.603 330
13 Transportation Equipment 2 .0 1 -0.18 0.932 168
2.5 Measures of International Com petition
In the previous sections we constructed measures of total factor productivity 
growth and markups. In the next section we attempt to link these measures 
with changes in the economic environment faced by Mexico in the mid and 
late eighties. Since it is not possible to summarise all international changes in 
one variable, we devote this section to an exposition of the various alternative 
measure of international competition that we consider.
The first measure we employ is the import tariff on output. The data 
set provides the tariff rate per year per industry, TARct. Figure 2.4a shows 
the average input tariff for the manufacturing sector as a whole, where the 
average has been weighted by value added. Whereas average tariffs are ap­
proximately 30 to 35 per cent until 1987, in 1988 they drop to about 15 per 
cent; The aggregation in figure 2.4a conceals large differences between the 
various industrial sectors. For instance, the beverage industries experienced
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a drop in the production-weighted official tariff rates from 81 per cent in 
1985 to 20 per cent in 1990. Table 2.5 presents these sectoral level data on 
openness.
Table 2.5: Protection of Mexican Industry by Sector
Sector Tariffs Licenses
1985 1990 1985 1990
Food 30.91 15.43 1 0 0 .0 0 11.45
Beverages 80.90 19.85 1 0 0 .0 0 37.04
Textiles 39.30 17.27 98.88 1.30
Wood and Paper 33.02 12.31 95.61 0 .0 0
Chemicals 34.48 14.72 89.25 0 .0 0
Metals 24.63 14.42 81.20 0 .6 6
Machinery 40.81 16.37 95.27 41.30
Tobacco 37.34 15.01 55.64 0 .0 0
Leather 44.70 16.90 1 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Cement 24.98 13.53 98.91 0 .0 0
Plastics 37.50 14.24 97.49 0 .0 0
Automobiles 24.88 16.41 93.34 0 .0 0
Other Transportation 46.30 18.90 95.10 0 .0 0
Aggregate 39.80 15.81 93.79 12.56
A second measure used is the percentage of output subject to licenses. 
As in the case of tariffs, the data set provides the license rate per year per 
industry LICct. We computed the overall percentage of production lines that 
are subject to import licenses. The market share (VA) is used as a weight 
and the evolution of the license coverage is depicted in figure 2.4b. The figure 
shows that in 1984, 94 per cent of domestic production was covered by import 
licenses. In 1985 license coverage started to drop reaching a level of just 13 
per cent by 1990. Table 2.5 shows that the differences between sectors are 
not nearly as pronounced in the case of licenses as they were for tariff rates.
i
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As a further measure of the level of international competition we examine 
actual trade flows. We construct the following industry and time-specific 
openness measure, OPENct
OPEN = ______________ IMPORTSct______________
ct VALPRODet +  IMPORTSc -  EXPORTS* ’ V j
where IMPORTSct denotes the imports of both capital and intermediate 
goods for each plant and each year, EXPORTSct denotes the exports for each 
plant in each year and VALPRODct gives the value of domestic production. 
We constructed an aggregate openness measure, using the market share (VA) 
as the weight for each firm. This is is shown in figure 2.4c, which suggests a 
gradual increase in openness between 1984 and 1990.
Finally, as a measure of industry concentration we calculate the Herfind­
ahl index, using value added as the output measure. We refer to this measure 
as CONCct The limitations of this measure deserve mentioning. Since we 
have a balanced panel and do not observe entry nor exit, changes in market 
share are not accurately captured. Furthermore, the Herfindahl index does 
not take account of contestability considerations.
Although we initially planned to also consider the impact of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) on firm level efficiency and markups, the data do not lend 
itself for such analysis. Since it is a balanced panel and no entry nor exit is 
observed, no suitable measure for changes in the level of FDI can be attained. 
We therefore exclude the effects of foreign investment from the analysis.
2.6 Markups and Openness
This section presents an attempt to link developments in the international 
trade regime to changes in marginal cost markups charged by producers. The 
analysis will be based on the sectoral markups presented in table 2.4.
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2.6.1 Correlation Coefficients
Table 2.6 gives the Pearson correlation coefficients for the relevant variables.31 
Sectoral data were used at annual intervals, generating a total of 91 obser­
vations. In calculating the correlation coefficients we used value added as a 
weight. SHARE represents the share of value added that is produced under 
foreign ownership.
Table 2.6: Correlations between Markups and Openness
MARKUP CONC TARIFF OPEN SHARE
MARKUP + 1 .0 0
CONC +0.73* + 1 .0 0
TARIFF +0.52* +0.36* + 1 .0 0
OPEN -0.33* -0.06 -0.29* + 1 .0 0
SHARE -0.76* -0.53* -0.29* -0.25* + 1 .0 0
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 2.6 shows a large number of significant correlations. First, the data 
suggest a positive and significant correlation between the tariff rate and the 
markup. The table also shows a negative and significant relationship between 
markups and openness. These two correlations suggest that lower trade 
barriers and increased openness can be associated with lower markups. In 
addition, we find that the markup is positively correlated with the Herfindahl 
concentration index. Finally, table 2.6 suggests that the markup tends to 
be lower when foreign-owned firms produce a larger share of the industry’s 
output.
31We also estimated the Spearman’s and Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients. 
Whereas the Pearson correlation coefficient tends to pick up linear associations, 
these measures tend to be better at capturing nonlinear trends. We found very 
similar qualitative results for all three measures and therefore only report the 
Pearson correlation coefficients.
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Table 2.6 also highlights some further issues of interest. Rather unsur­
prisingly, it shows that openness increases as the tariff rate falls. More inter­
estingly, it suggests a positive and significant relation between the share of 
foreign ownership and the openness of an industrial sector. The correlation 
between the tariff rate and the share of foreign ownership is negative. Un­
fortunately, the correlation coefficients do not enable us to draw inferences 
about the direction of causality. The most plausible interpretation seems that 
foreign firms choose to operate in those industrial sectors that are relatively 
more open to international trade.
2.6.2 Another Regression
We will proceed to try to establish a more formal link between changes in 
markups and the evolution of Mexican trade policy in the eighties. As above 
we use data at the sectoral level.
The equation we estimate is
MARKUPst =  0O +  fliTARst +  02OPENst +  03CONCst +  est , (2 .6 .1)
where subscript s denotes the sectoral level, where s — 1 , 13. Since the
markup is only assumed to change in 1988, we only consider 2 time periods: 
pre and post trade liberalisation. As before, we assume that the change in 
policy occurs in 1988.32 This reduces the number of observations to 26.
Note that we have excluded license coverage from 2.6.1. We originally 
performed a regression which also include license coverage as a dependent 
variable. Suspecting that the dependence was particularly strong between 
tariffs and import licenses, we decided to omit one of the two as an attempt 
to reduce multicollinearity. We experimented by including each one in turn
32We calculated sectoral averages of the independent variables. Using value 
added as a weight, our pre-trade observations averaged over the years 1984-1987, 
whereas our post-trade observations are the mean of the remaining years.
i
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and found that the estimations differed minimally. We eventually selected 
the tariff rate, primarily because it varies relatively more at the sectoral 
level.33
Since the variables in the regression reflect means rather than individual 
observations, the appropriate method of estimation is weighted least squares 
(WLS), where the weight is value added.34 The results of the WLS estimation 
of 2.6.1 are reported in table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Markups and International Trade
00 0i 02 0s R2 Nobs.
0.9953**
(0.1142)
0.0053*
(0.0030)
-0.8006**
(0.3366)
4.0630**
(0.8298)
0.714 26
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
The regression in table 2.7 reveals that markups are lowered when the 
economy becomes more open. It also suggests that reductions in the tariff 
rate will lower the markup, although this relationship is only significant at the 
10 per cent level. The regression supports the hypothesis that trade imposes 
a procompetitive discipline on producers. The entry of internationally traded 
goods into the market forces firms located in Mexico to adjust their markups 
and lower their prices.
33In addition, one could argue that the tariff measure ‘incorporates’ exchange 
rate movements more accurately. The initial impact of the changes in trade policy 
was softened by a real devaluation of the peso. Since tariffs came down slightly later 
than quotas, they are a more suitable measure of the threat of foreign competition.
34Although heteroscedasticity does not destroy the unbiasedness and consistency 
properties of the usual ordinary least squares estimators, they are no longer effi­
cient. Weighted least squares is the most common approach to remediation. It is 
also not implausible that the above regression suffers from endogeneity problems. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to construct any appropriate instruments.
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2.7 Productivity and Openness
The impact of the trade opening on total factor productivity growth is the 
final missing link in the analysis. This section presents an attempt to formally 
link the changes in markups and the international regime to changes in the 
rate of total factor productivity growth.
2.7.1 Some M ore Correlation Coefficients
Table 2.8 gives the Pearson correlation coefficients for the relevant variables.35 
As before, we used sectoral data at annual intervals and employed value added 
as a weight in calculating the correlation coefficients. To allow for underlying 
sectoral differences in total factor productivity, we first differenced the data 
and generated a variable ATFP .36
Table 2.8: Correlations between TFP Growth and Openness
ATFP OPEN TARIFF AMARKUP SHARE
ATFP + 1 .0 0
OPEN +0.30* + 1 .0 0
TARIFF -0.28* -0.25* + 1 .0 0
AMARKUP -0.17 -0 .1 2 + 0 .1 1 + 1 .0 0
SHARE 0.06 +0.24* -0.24* +0.40* + 1 .0 0
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
AMARKUP represents the change in the markup for each sector. This is 
equal to 7 sDt as estimated in equation 2.4.4 and as reported in table 2.4.
35 Again, we also used the Spearman’s and Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients, 
but found that the differences were minimal.
36Alternatively, we could have worked with ratios. Some experimentation has 
led us to believe that this would produce similar results.
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Recall that for each industrial sector it therefore takes on only one of two 
values.
Table 2.8 suggests a positive correlation between trade liberalisation and 
total factor productivity growth. As tariffs are lowered and openness in­
creases, ATFP rises. A decrease in markups is associated with higher total 
factor productivity growth, but this correlation is not significant at the 5  per 
cent level. Finally, there is a slight positive correlation between the share of 
foreign ownership and productivity growth.
2.7.2 A Final Regression
We conclude this analysis with a final regression of the trade policy measures 
and the markup on total factor productivity growth.
As in the previous section, we first included both the tariff rate and license 
coverage as explanatory variables. Suspecting multicollinearity, we then de­
cided to omit the license coverage variable. The equation we estimated is
ATFPst =  fa  +  0iOPENst +  02TARIFFst +  <foAMARKUPst +  e* , (2.7.1)
where subscript s denotes the sectoral level, where s =  1 , 13 and t =
1985,.... 1990. The change in the markup AMARKUP only has a pre and a
post trade liberalisation value and is therefore constant over the 1984-87 and 
over the 1988-90 periods.
We estimated 2.7.1 using WLS, where the appropriate weight is given 
by value added. Table 2.9 shows the estimated links between trade and to­
tal factor productivity growth. The regression suggests that TFP growth is 
inversely related to the tariff rate. As tariff rates are lowered and trade is 
liberalised, total factor productivity growth picks up. TFP also accelerates 
when the economy becomes more open. Finally, lower markups increase pro­
ductivity growth although this link is not found to be statistically significant 
at the 1 0  per cent level.
42
Table 2.9: TFP Growth and Trade Policy Measures
<£o 4>\ <t>2 <^3 R2 Nobs.
0.0346
(0.0319)
0.1735**
(0.0825)
-0.0018*
(0 .0 0 1 0 )
-0.1014
(0.0948)
0.149 78
The impact of trade on total factor productivity growth can thus be 
subdivided into direct effects and an indirect effect. Table 2.9 shows that 
lowered tariffs and increased openness directly translate into TFP growth. 
Interestingly, our regressions also suggest that there is a further indirect 
effect, operating through the procompetitive discipline that trade imposes on 
the product market. As markups come down, productivity growth increases. 
Unfortunately, this link is not statistically significant.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
Mexico implemented a wideranging program of trade liberalisation in the 
late eighties. Making this process irreversible is one of the more important 
objectives of NAFTA. Assessing the impact of this reform process on market 
structure and productivity growth is therefore an essential element in any 
comprehensive evaluation of NAFTA. In this paper, we used data obtained 
from the Industrial Survey in Mexico, combined with trade statistics and 
data on foreign ownership, to begin just such an evaluation.
We first of all found a link between trade liberalisation and decreased price 
cost margins. After the opening up of the economy, price cost margins fell on 
average 11 per cent. We found that the tariff rate and the actual openness 
of the economy were statistically significant in explaining these changes.
We also established a - somewhat weaker - link between trade opening 
and total factor productive growth of firms. We find that between 1988 and 
1990, TFP growth on average exceeds 8  per cent a year. This is several
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times as fast as GDP grew over the same period. We also find some evidence 
that lower tariffs and increased openness have contributed to the increase in 
productivity growth.
One problem we incurred in the analysis in this chapter is that Mex­
ican trade liberalisation coincided with the recovery of the Mexican econ­
omy from a deep recession. Distinguishing between trade liberalisation and 
economy-wide macroeconomic forces is very difficult. One possible clue may 
be provided by the behaviour of markups. There is some weak evidence that 
markups fall with demand. For instance, in their study of German manu­
facturing industries, Flaig and Steiner [42] find the marginal cost markup 
to be procyclical. Berndt et al. [3] also find a procyclical markup for Gen­
eral Motors and Ford. However, they identify a countercyclical markup for 
Chrysler.
If markups indeed behave procyclically, the role for trade liberalisation in 
explaining the trends identified in this chapter is strengthened. However, al­
though there may be some evidence that reduced markups may be attributed 
to trade liberalisation rather than the business cycle, this evidence is rather 
weak. Several theories argue instead that markups are countercyclical, thus 
weakening the argument for trade liberalisation.
In this chapter we have claimed that trade liberalisation has a procom- 
petitive effect on the product market and therefore reduces price marginal 
cost markups. Furthermore, we have suggested that this procompetitive dis­
cipline also affects the factor market. The remainder of this thesis focuses 
on theoretical arguments behind these links. How does increased competi­
tion affect incentives in the factor market? In the next chapter we turn to 
the market for intermediate goods, followed by the labour market in chapter 
4. Incorporating factor market imperfections will be a crucial step in the 
analysis.
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2.9 Appendix
The following table shows estimated markups using fixed effect models and 
setting the cost of capital at 5 per cent. The technology estimates used are 
those generated by the aggregate translog production function (table 2 .4 ).
Table A l: Experiments with the Aggregate Markup Equation
Regression I II III IV
P 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.35
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
7 -0 .1 0 -0 .1 0 -0 .1 0 -0 .1 0
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
grouped by industry plant ownership plant size
There are 12492 observations and all coefficients are statistically signifi­
cant at the 1 per cent level.
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2.10 D ata Appendix
The data come from several sources. The data on the technological struc­
ture of the firm are from the Encuesta Industrial Anual from 1984 to 1990 
inclusive. Observations are identified by a four digit industrial code, a plant 
code and a year. The data cover the largest plants, on average accounting 
for approximately 80 per cent of the output in each industry. The data also 
included price indices for investment goods and as well as sectoral price in­
dices for output. The data on ownership were carried out as an additional 
survey. Finally, the openness data were constructed by Adriaan Ten Kaete.
Since we suspected that the data set contained a number of errors, we 
designed several criteria to screen the data. We excluded all establishments 
for which
(i) gross value of output < 0
(ii) value added < 0
(iii) exports > sales
(iv) imports > sales
(v) ownership information was unclear
(vi) total number of workers < 0
(vii) total costs < 0
After applying these criteria we were left with 2082 establishments. All 
the results in chapter 2  are based on this sample.
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Figure 2.1: Total Factor Productivity of All Firms
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Figure 2.3: Total Factor Productivity by Industrial Sector
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Figure 2.4: The Evolution of Mexican Trade Policy
0.22
0 .2 0 -
0.18-
0.16-
0.14
0.12
0 . 10 -
0.08
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
  Openness
45
40
35-
30
25-
2 0 -
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
 Tariff R a te  (% )
100
80-
60-
40-
20
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
 License Coverage (%)
Chapter 3
Efficiency Gains from Economic 
Integration: The Hold-up 
Problem
Here’s the rule for bargains: Do other men, for they would do 
you.
Charles Dickens, Martin Chuzzlewit, 1844.
3.1 Introduction
International economists have long preoccupied themselves with proving the 
gains from trade. Initially, the formal derivations of these gains were re­
stricted to perfectly competitive, constant returns to scale environments 
where countries traded to exploit their relative complementarities. Casual 
observation suggests that trade also takes place between countries produc­
ing only slightly different varieties within generally similar product groups. 
Recent advances in industrial organisation and game theory have supported 
the formal derivation of gains from trade in models of imperfect competition 
and increasing returns to scale.
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The study of gains from trade in the presence of market distortions first 
became popular in the 1950s. Initially, gains from trade results were driven 
by rather ad-hoc factor market distortions. Following developments in game 
theory and industrial organisation, the new trade theory succeeded in the 
derivation of various alternative mechanisms of trade-related welfare gains in 
the presence of product market imperfections. These include welfare gains 
from an expansion of the available varieties, the exploitation of increasing 
returns to scale and the procompetitive effect that trade exerts on the product 
market.
In this chapter we examine the effects of factor market distortions in the 
framework suggested by the new trade literature. To model factor market 
distortions, we employ recent ideas from the theory of incomplete contracts. 
We assume that the industrial structure of the industry in question can be 
represented by a vertically linked, bilateral monopoly. An upstream firm sup­
plies an intermediate good to a downstream firm. The upstream firm makes 
a cost-reducing investment. We demonstrate that under autarky there is 
a hold-up problem and the upstream firm underinvests. We then allow for 
some forms of international economic integration and derive both allocative 
and productive efficiency gains. As in many models not based on factor en­
dowments, we find that trade in goods and factors are imperfect substitutes.
The chapter can be outlined as follows. In section 3.2, we describe the 
closed economy model. We assume production in the sector of interest is or­
ganised as a bilateral monopolistic relationship and identify the equilibrium 
inefficiencies. The remainder of the chapter analyses the consequences as the 
economy gradually begins to integrate with a second country. Section 3.3 
considers unrestricted trade of the downstream good. It is shown that down­
stream product trade reduces allocative inefficiencies, but does not affect 
productive inefficiencies. The central part of this chapter follows in section 
3.4, which considers the possibility of relocation of one of the downstream
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firms. It is argued that relocation may bring about productive efficiency 
gains that can be attributed to (i) increasing returns to scale and (ii) the 
reduction of the hold-up problem. After a brief discussion of the distribu­
tion of the above gains, section 3.5 concludes. The appendix to this chapter 
presents a richer and more complicated model and tries to suggests how the 
conclusions in the main part of the chapter may be affected if allocative and 
productive inefficiencies are more closely intertwined.
3.2 The Closed Economy
3.2.1 T he Basic M odel under Autarky
Production
The model in this section is a partial equilibrium model, focusing on the 
production of one industrial sector, labeled X. Production in X is organised 
as a bilateral monopolistic relationship, with an upstream firm supplying 
an intermediate product to a downstream firm.1 The downstream firm in 
turn acts as a monopolist in the product market and thus faces both factor 
and product market imperfections. It is assumed that the downstream firm 
only demands one unit of the upstream product. As in Hart and Tirole [55], 
the downstream firm has limited needs, i.e. the upstream firm faces an 
inelastic demand for its output. The upstream good can be viewed as a piece 
of machinery or technology that allows the downstream firm to produce at 
constant marginal cost, Cd. The appendix at the end of this chapter presents 
an alternative case, where the level of investment of the upstream firm does
xAs in much of the literature on trade and trade policy under market imper­
fections, we assume an exogenously specified market structure. Some attempts 
have been made to develop models that generate alternative market structures 
for different parameterisations of the model. A particularly interesting example is 
presented in Horstmann and Markusen [59].
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not only affect variable production costs of the upstream firm, but also of the 
downstream firm. The implications of this will be considered in due course.
As a prerequisite for production, the upstream firm needs to make a cost- 
reducing investment. Since the upstream and downstream firms are involved 
in a long-run bilateral trading relationship, these upstream investments are 
likely to be party-specific. Specific investments refers to a situation where 
an assets full productive value is only attained within the specific trading 
relationship that it was designed for. Asset specificity creates a ’lock-in’ 
effect, as the two firms will find it beneficial to trade amongst themselves 
rather than with outsiders.2
These asset specificities will serve as a motive for vertical integration. In 
this paper we assume that the costs associated with merging exceed the ben­
efits, so that no integration occurs. Recent work in incomplete contracting 
theory has suggested a wide range of motives that may keep firms from in­
tegrating. For instance, Holmstrom and Tirole [61] suggest that integration 
may lead to a loss of information about the subordinate’s performance. Fur­
ther incentive problems are highlighted by Grossman and Hart [45] and Hart 
and Moore [54]. Hart and Tirole [55] suggest that prohibitive legal costs may 
prevent mergers or that an efficient court may forbid foreclosure.3
We model decision making by the upstream and downstream firms as a 
two-stage process. In the first stage, the upstream firm decides how much to 
invest. This investment is sunk immediately. Let C u(Ii)  denote the marginal 
production costs of the upstream firm, expressed as a function of the in­
2Williamson [134] suggests that the presence of switching costs can result from 
a wide range of different specificities, including site specifity, human capital speci­
ficity (e.g. through learning by doing), physical capital specificity, brand name 
capital or dedicated assets.
3For a more detailed discussion, refer to Hart and Holmstrom [53], who discuss 
a variety of further integration costs, including costs brought about by uncertainty 
about future outcomes as well as implementation costs. Institutional factors, such 
as anti-trust legislation may also prevent firms from merging.
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vestment level by the upstream firm, / i5 where i=a,f,c, for autarky, free 
trade of the downstream good and capital mobility of the downstream firm 
respectively.4 Let
dCu(Ii)
dlt
and
< 0 , (3.2.1)
d2Cu(Ii) „
- ^ > 0 ,  (3.2.2)
implying that investment reduces the marginal costs of production, but at 
a decreasing rate. In the second stage, the upstream firm produces and the 
good is supplied to the downstream firm. The downstream firm then uses it 
in its production process and sells its goods in the final product market.
Consumption
Utility takes the quasi-linear form
Ua = Z  + ± ( x f ) a , (3.2.3)
where 0 < a < 1 and Z  is a second consumption good. Demand for the 
downstream good X d under autarky is then given by
# = ( P i ) " "  . (3-2-4)
providing income is no less than PdX d =  P ^ .  Pd is the price of the down­
stream good under autarky and p =  denotes the price elasticity of de­
mand faced by the downstream producer. Note that \p\ > 1 implies that 
the price charged by the downstream monopolist always exceeds its marginal 
cost. Quasi-linear utility dictates that the demand for X d is only a function 
of its price Pd. It is independent of income or the price of Z. As the price of
4We shall employ general cost functions throughout the analysis. A tractable 
alternative could use linear demands and quadratic investment costs. All the 
qualitative results of the model carry through in this context. For the use of linear 
prices, see for instance Farrell and Gallini [40].
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X d falls, the quantity demanded rises, but there is no income effect in the 
demand for X d.
Bargaining
As the firms are unable to commit to a price beforehand, the future return 
of present actions will depend on the bargaining position of the upstream and 
downstream firms at a future date. At that date, the two firms take the in­
vestment decision of the upstream firm as given and bargain over any gains 
from exchange. We model the bargaining behaviour between the upstream 
and the downstream firm using the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, 
with a fixed threat point involving no trade between the two agents.5 We 
suppose that a constant fraction, (3, of the surplus of supplying the down­
stream firm accrues to the upstream firm, where 0 < (3 < 1. The remaining 
share 1 — (3 goes to the downstream firm.
The Nash solution implies that firms will maximise the joint gains from 
trading the upstream good,
m axn a =  [(P* -  Cd) X* -  P“] ^  K  -  < 3 f  , (3.2.5)
a
where P“ is the price of the upstream good bargained by the upstream and 
downstream firms under autarky. Note that the investment costs encountered 
by the upstream firm are sunk in the second stage and therefore do not 
enter the bargain. To highlight this, we have suppressed the dependence of 
upstream prices and costs on investment. The literature commonly refers to
ba =  (Pf -  C*)X* (3.2.6)
as the benefit of the upstream good to the downstream firm. The overall
5We selected the Nash bargaining solution because of its great generality and its 
simple form which does not require any specification of the bargaining process. The 
fixed threat point (0,0) implies that levels of trade are not contractually specified 
and can therefore not be enforced by a court. For further detail, see Osborne and 
Rubinstein [106].
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surplus from trade between the two firms can then be denoted by
ba ~ Cl , (3.2.7)
where the price of the upstream good is set to affect this division. We will
also assume that
ba > Cl , (3.2.8)
so that the two firms are involved in a trading relationship. To eliminate
any bargaining inefficiencies due to information asymmetries we assume that 
profits and upstream production costs axe common knowledge in the second 
stage.
The solution to the bargaining problem between the upstream and down­
stream firm is obtained by maximising 3.2.5, giving
P“(/«) =  ba +  (1 -  P) ( c u(la) -  6a) . (3.2.9)
3.2.2 Solving the Basic M odel
Having specified the model, we can now solve for the industry equilibrium. 
As usual, we consider the second stage first.
Second Stage: Downstream Prices
In the second stage, the downstream firm takes the upstream level of 
investment as given and sets prices to solve the following maximisation prob­
lem
maxn^  = (P* -  COXftPj) -  P“
*a
subject to P“ =  ba + (1 -  /3)(Cl -  60) . (3.2.10)
The constraint reiterates that the price of the intermediate good is deter­
mined by Nash bargaining between the two firms, with j3 commonly inter-
| preted as the bargaining power of the upstream firm. As before, we have
i
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suppressed the dependence on investment to illustrate that investment is 
sunk in the second stage.
The first order conditions of the downstream monopolist satisfies
p“ v1 -  i ) = ° d’ (3-2-n)
where \p\ is the price elasticity of demand facing the downstream mo­
nopolist. The equilibrium product price decreases as the price elasticity of 
demand increases.
First Stage: Upstream Investment
In the first stage, the upstream firm decides how much to invest, taking 
into account the effect that its investment will have on second stage prices. 
The upstream firm maximises
m axIF (/a) =  K - C u(Ia) - I ala
subject to Pu(/a) =  ba +  (1 -  /?) (Cu(Ia) -  ba) , (3.2.12)
Substituting in the constraint, we obtain
m axn“(/0) =  >9(6 -  <?“(/„)) -  /„ . (3.2.13)
■*o
The first order condition implies that investment by the upstream firm occurs
S O - I .
As the outcome of the firm’s maximisation problem, we will refer to this as 
the privately optimal level of investment.
3.2.3 Efficiency
The level of upstream investment only affects the fixed costs of the down­
stream firm. Since downstream prices are set as a mark-up over downstream
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variable costs, any investment distortion is independent of potential con­
sumption distortions. In analysing efficiency and welfare effects, the second- 
best problem does therefore not arise. This implies that productive and 
allocative distortions can be analysed separately.
Productive Efficiency
Equation 3.2.14 defined the solution to the actual and privately optimal in­
vestment level of the upstream firm. The following simple argument, adapted 
from Grout [47], will demonstrate that this level does not coincide with the 
socially efficient investment level.
To show this, we proceed to calculate the socially optimal investment 
level by maximising
m axW (Ia) = ba -  Cu{Ia) -  Ia , (3.2.15)la
where W is a measure of social welfare.6 Equation 3.2.15 generates the 
following first order condition:
dCu(Ia)
dla
= -1  . (3.2.16)
As a comparison of conditions 3.2.14 and 3.2.16 indicates, bilateral bargaining 
over the upstream good results in a distortion of the investment incentives 
of the upstream firm. The convexity of Cu(Ia) dictates that the upstream 
firm will underinvest with respect to the socially optimal outcome. The level 
of underinvestment increases as the bargaining power of the firm decreases. 
Once the upstream investment has been made in stage one of the game, the 
investor is vulnerable to the no-trade threat from the specific buyer. It is 
precisely this threat that enables the downstream firm to capture a portion
Alternatively this outcome can be viewed as the optimal level of upstream 
investment when the upstream and downstream firms are vertically integrated.
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of the cost savings induced by the specific investment of the upstream firm, 
a situation referred to as the hold-up problem. The downstream firm can 
capture a larger portion of these saving as p  falls, resulting in lower levels of 
upstream investment and thus greater social inefficiencies. Williamson [134] 
refers to the behaviour of the downstream firm as opportunism.
Allocative Efficiency
As shown by equation 3.2.11, the monopolist sets prices as a markup over 
marginal costs. As long as 1 < p < oo price exceeds marginal revenue and the 
quantity of output supplied by the downstream firm is less than the Pareto 
optimal quantity. The societal loss resulting from this allocative inefficiency 
is larger when demand faced by the downstream firm becomes less elastic.
We have shown in this section that in the presence of hold-up, the econ­
omy is plagued by both allocative and productive inefficiencies. Downstream 
product prices are excessively high and upstream investment is too low rel­
ative to the socially optimal outcome. The magnitude of these inefficiencies 
depends on consumer preferences, the properties of the cost function of the 
upstream firm and the size of p. Interestingly, the appendix shows that 
when upstream investment affects downstream variable costs, the observed 
investment level may be either greater or smaller than the socially optimal 
level.
Having identified the equilibrium inefficiencies under autarky, the next 
section proceeds to analyse the impact of downstream product trade. The 
core of this chapter follows in section 3.4, which analyses the impact of firm 
mobility on upstream investment distortions.
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3.3 Trade of the Downstream Product
Now assume that there exist two economies of the type just outlined in sec­
tion 3.2.1. We will refer to them as Home and Foreign. To highlight the main 
issues of the paper, suppose that both countries have identical market size, 
tastes, technologies and factor endowments, and that there exist no physi­
cal, cultural or institutional transportation costs between the two nations. 
We treat the two countries as a single integrated market for the downstream 
product, where competitors set prices for the combined market rather than 
setting them independently for each nation.7 We further assume that both 
upstream firms produce a homogeneous product whereas the downstream 
firms produce two horizontally differentiated varieties within the same gen­
eral product group. Suppose that the two economies open up to trade, and 
that only the downstream product is tradable.8 This non-tradability of the 
upstream good dictates that the bargaining game between the two firms is 
unaffected by trade and facilitates the distinction between investment and 
consumption distortions.
This section will show that there exist allocative efficiency gains from 
trade, even if Home and Foreign are identical in all respects. The market 
power of the downstream firm is reduced and a more efficient market struc­
ture replaces the former monopoly. The following analysis is supplementary 
to Markusen [90], where similar results are derived in an environment of 
Cournot-Nash competition. Before analysing efficiency issues we first incor­
porate two horizontally differentiated downstream varieties into the demand
7The segmented markets perception would introduce a further strategic incen­
tive for international trade. For an exposition of reciprocal dumping see the clas­
sic paper by Brander and Krugman [18]. A discussion of the integrated versus 
segmented market perception and its impact on trade theory can be found in 
Markusen [90] or Venables [130].
8Spencer and Jones [121, 122] and Karp and Sioli [64] have identified strategic 
incentives for restricting trade of the upstream good.
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side of the model presented in section 3.2.1.
3.3.1 The M odel under Downstream Product Trade
When more than one downstream variety is available to consumers, X d 
in 3.2.4 is a composite of the form
situation. The parameter a is such that a > 1, where a smaller a indicates 
a stronger consumer preference for variety per se.
With X f  as a composite, We can think of the consumption decision as 
taking place in two stages: first the consumer considers how much of the 
composite to consume by solving the overall maximisation problem. Then 
the consumer decides how much of the different varieties to consume.
Solving the first stage maximisation problem, we find that
where (i = jX-, the elasticity of demand faced by the industry as a whole 
with respect to the price index Pj*, where
Pj[ t represents the price of the domestically produced downstream variety
country. Note also that symmetry assumptions and the absence of any trade 
barriers imply that the prices of each variety is the same in both countries.
where X d denotes the quantity of the variety of the downstream good pro­
duced by a home firm and X d is the quantity of the variety of the downstream 
good produced by the foreign firm. The subscript t denotes the free trade
(3.3.2)
(3.3.3)
under trade and Pd t gives the price of the variety produced in the foreign
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The second stage demand for any specific variety can now be derived. As 
in Dixit and Stiglitz [31], the demand for any particular variety is given by
Xf,t = Xt(fP)° ’ (3-3-4)
for j  = h, / ,  where h denotes the domestically produced downstream variety 
and f the foreign variety. Note that under autarky demand for one variety - as 
given by 3.3.4 - reduces to demand for the industry as a whole - represented 
by 3.3.3.
Second Stage: Downstream Prices
With the introduction of free trade of the downstream goods the industrial 
structure is changed from monopolistic to duopolistic. Strategic interactions 
have to be considered and the second stage maximisation problem becomes
m a*n4t =  (P£, -  Cd) X dt(P{t, P%) -  P“,
P3,t
subject to P“t =  bj>t + ( l - 0 ) ( C “t - b j>t) , (3.3.5)
for j  — h, / .  The subscript t indexes the free trade trade situation. Note
that the nontradability of the upstream good implies that the general form
of the bargaining game in the input market is unaffected.
Assuming that the two downstream firms take one another’s price as con­
stant, profit optimisation in a Bertrand-Nash fashion produces the following 
first order condition
( i - - L ) = C d , (3.3.6)
where e^t denotes the perceived elasticity of demand of the firm producing 
the variety associated with country j. As in Smith and Venables [118], we 
substitute 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 into 3.3.4 and differentiate with respect to P£t. 
Employing Bertrand conjectures, we then obtain
e3,t =  °  ~  ~  V)  S3,t , ( 3 -3 -7 )
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where p is the aggregate industry demand elasticity and Sj is the share of 
the downstream firm of country j in each market. As before, a represents 
the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of the variety itself, and 
subscript t denotes the situation under free trade. As 3.3.7 demonstrates, the 
perceived elasticity of demand depends both on the elasticity of demand for 
a single differentiated product, <7 , and on the perceived effect of the action 
of one firm on the cumulative industry supply.
Whenever the industrial structure is not monopolistic (i.e. Sj < 1),
a > /i. (3.3.8)
The intuition here is rather simple. If one of the two downstream duopolists 
changes its price, the change in quantity demanded faced by the particular 
firm exceeds the change in demand for the industrial sector in its entirety. 
Hence, the elasticity of demand for its own variety, cr, is greater than the 
aggregate industry demand elasticity, where the latter includes the actions 
of the second firm.
First Stage: Upstream Investment
Under free downstream product trade, the upstream firm maximises
m axn“( 4 t) =  P“t -  CU(IM) -  Ijlt
Ij,*
subject to Pu(Ij,t) =  +  (1 -  P)(Cu{Ij,t) ~  h t )  » (3.3.9)
for j  = h, f .
Maximising gives the following first order condition
dCu(Ij>t) 1
dlj,t P
(3.3.10)
The privately optimal level of investment under trade of the downstream 
product has therefore remained unchanged from its autarky level.
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3.3.2 Efficiency
This section will illustrate that the equilibrium allocative inefficiencies that 
were present under autarky have been reduced by the introduction of free 
trade. However, the productive inefficiencies still persist. Profits of both the 
upstream and downstream firms fall under trade.
Allocative Efficiency
As 3.2.10 and 3.2.11 show, under autarky the perceived elasticity of de­
mand is solely determined by the curvature of the aggregate industry demand 
curve. With the introduction of free trade the industrial structure is changed 
from monopolistic to duopolistic. Equation 3.3.7 suggests that this will in­
crease the perceived elasticity of demand of each of the two downstream 
firms. Now that a substitute is available, consumers will be more responsive 
to price changes of one of the two varieties. Since Cd is constant, the profit 
maximising conditions 3.2.11 and 3.3.6 imply that
p i  > p % ■ (3-3.il)
for j  =  /i, / ,  the varieties produced by the home and foreign firms respec­
tively.
Opening the economy to trade lowers the price charged by the down­
stream firm in each country. The increase in the perceived elasticity of de­
mand reduces the size of the markup of prices over marginal costs, which 
in turn diminishes the extent of the allocative inefficiency. These changes 
are all driven by the procompetitive effects of opening a monopolistic sector 
of the economy to international trade and so reducing the concentration of 
market power.9
9Note that the above results do not trivially extend to the analysis of vertical 
product differentiation. Gabszewicz et al. [43] derive that the number of prod­
ucts that can exist in a vertically differentiated product market is bounded from
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Productive Efficiency
Trade of the downstream good has no impact on productive efficiency. 
As the industrial structure of each of the participating countries remains 
one of a bilateral monopoly, the bargaining game between the upstream 
and downstream firm remains unchanged. Trade of the downstream product 
therefore does not alter the first stage upstream investment maximisation 
problem and productive inefficiencies remain as under autarky.10
This result is specific to the assumption that the benefit of the upstream 
good to the downstream firm is independent of the level of investment. In 
the present set-up downstream marginal production costs are constant and 
independent of upstream investment levels. This separates the consumption 
and the investment distortions. The appendix considers the case where up­
stream investment affects the variable production costs of both the upstream 
and the downstream firms. It shows that international trade then reduces 
both the consumption as well as the investment distortions.
3.3.3 D istribution of Gains
We have just shown that trade in the downstream product encourages com­
petition between two former monopolists and thus reduces distortions in the
above and is independent of market size. They proceed to show that there exists a 
tendency for the total number of products coexisting at equilibrium to fall under 
free trade, with low quality goods being driven out of the market. An interest­
ing extension to the present model would involve the introduction of a vertically 
differentiated product space.
10It would be very interesting to consider the impact of the upstream good also 
being tradable. However, within bargaining theory there is no general agreement 
on how to model this. A framework of double margins may be able to offer some 
further insight but is beyond the scope of this chapter.
66
product market. After some substitutions, we can proceed to show that the 
utility of a representative consumer is strictly higher under trade, i.e.
for j=/i, / .  Increased utility under trade is the result of two different forces. 
First, increased competition reduces downstream markups over production 
costs. This is captured by the second component of the utility function. In 
addition, trade has doubled the number of varieties available to the consumer 
and as consumers value variety per se, this further raises consumer welfare. 
This is captured by the first term of the utility expression. These two forces 
cumulatively act to generate an increase in consumer satisfaction.
As a result of trade and competition, the downstream producers now face 
a higher elasticity of demand for their particular product type. This induces 
the downstream duopolists to decrease their markup over marginal costs. 
The elasticity of demand dictates that total revenue of the downstream firms 
increases. However, as the industrial structure in the product market changes 
from monopolistic to duopolistic, total costs also rise. Some algebraic manip­
ulation illustrates that the benefit of the upstream good to the downstream 
firm will fall as a result of trade.
The algebra here may seem to hide the simple intuition. As the change 
in industrial structure reduces markup and increases demand, total revenue
(3.3.12)
(3.3.13)
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increases, but not by as much as total production costs. The benefit of the 
upstream good to the downstream firm is therefore reduced. Equation 3.2.9 
indicates that this lowered benefit will translate into a drop in the price of the 
upstream good. Both upstream and downstream firms therefore face lower 
profits, with the distribution of the losses being determined by /?, the relative 
bargaining power of the firms.
The direction of the overall welfare effects are systematically summarised 
in table 3.1. It suggests that free trade of the downstream product benefits 
consumers at the cost of producers. However, as net allocative efficiency 
gains are attained, compensation of the firms is a viable policy option.
Table 3.1: The Welfare Effects of Downstream Product Trade
Agent Magnitude Sign
Consumers Uj,t — Ujya +
Downstream Firm (1 — P)(bj,t ~~ bj,a) -
Upstream Firm P(Pj,t ~ bj,a) -
In the above table Uj>a denotes utility under autarky for a consumer in 
j  = h , f .  Ujj denotes utility under trade of the downstream product, bj,a 
is the benefit of the upstream good to the downstream firm under autarky, 
bjj denotes this same benefit under trade of the downstream product, and (3 
denotes the relative bargaining power of the two firms.
3.4 M obility of the Downstream Firm
Suppose that economic integration proceeds to the next stage and that the 
downstream firms can choose to locate in either country. We assume that 
the upstream firms stay internationally immobile. Three alternative equilib­
rium outcomes are now possible. First, the firms may choose to continue to
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produce in their respective home countries. The outcome then reduces to the 
free trade scenario outlined in the previous section. Alternatively, one of the 
two downstream firms may choose to move to the other country. Because of 
the symmetric nature of the model, we will restrict the analysis to the case in 
which the foreign downstream firm may relocate to the home country. As the 
upstream good is non-tradable, the domestic upstream firm will then supply 
both downstream firms. In contrast to Bolton and Whinston [12], we assume 
there are no supply assurance problems.
In this section, we first assume that the foreign downstream firm relocates 
and examine the impact of this move on the first stage investment decision 
of the upstream firm. This provides some insight as to if and when it would 
be optimal for one of the downstream firms to relocate. We proceed to 
briefly suggest under what circumstances relocation is more likely to be the 
equilibrium outcome. Lastly, we consider efficiency gains and distributional 
consequences.
3.4.1 The M odel under Capital M obility
The entry of the foreign downstream firm provides the upstream firm with 
the opportunity to sell one unit of its product to the new buyer. However, 
because of the specificity of the investments that the upstream firm has made, 
these assets cannot be redeployed to the foreign user without some sacrifice 
of productive value. We will therefore assume that a trading relationship of 
the upstream firm with the foreign downstream firm results in the upstream 
production cost corresponding to an investment of AI, where A 6 [0,1]. A =  0 
corresponds to the most extreme form of asset specificity, whereas A =  1 
signifies the absence of any trade specific investments. Variable production 
costs of the upstream firm are then given by Cu(A/c), where the subscript c 
denotes capital mobility of the downstream firm.
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Bargaining
As in Hart and Tirole [55], we shall assume that the bargaining power 
of the upstream firm is not worsened when a second downstream firm enters 
the market. Suppose that the upstream firm now captures a fraction j3' 
of the surplus of supplying a downstream firm, where (3* > /3 so that the 
upstream firm does (weakly) better bargaining with two downstream firms 
than with one. We also assume that /?' < 1, so that the competition between 
the downstream firms is not fierce enough for all downstream profits to be 
eliminated.
Bargaining between the domestic upstream and downstream firm now 
maximises
maxfia =  [(p£c -  Cd) X dc -  P ^ ] 1-'  [? lc -  C l /  . (3.4.1)
/ l ,C
This yields the following price for the upstream good
K c  = Kc  +  (1 -  P) (Clc -  bh,c) . (3.4.2)
Bargaining between the domestic upstream and the foreign downstream firm 
maximises
max n o =  [ (P k  -  Cd) X dc -  P?,Ac] ^  [P J*  -  CJM] , (3.4.3)1/3'
/ ,  Ac
yielding
P/,Ac =  h e  +  (1 -  ( t )  ( C l Xc -  bf ,c)  . (3.4.4)
Suppose further that
bf,c > C l Xc , (3.4.5)
so that trade with both upstream firms is beneficial.12
12Alternatively, one could model the entry of the second downstream firm in the
market as an outside option for the domestic upstream firm. This approach is
particularly appropriate when there are supply assurance concerns.
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Second Stage: Downstream Prices
Because of the symmetric nature of the model and the absence of any barriers 
to trade, the downstream maximisation problem is analogous to the free trade 
situation. Although the profits of the upstream firm may be altered as the 
price of the upstream good changes, this can be fully attributed to changes 
in fixed costs and therefore does not affect the downstream pricing decision.
First Stage: Upstream Investment
Given the entry of a second downstream firm and the changes in relative 
bargaining power induced by this entry, the upstream firm now maximises
m axn “( /AlC) =  (p “(/ft,c) -  cr{lh,c)) +  (P“(A4,c) -  C 'fA /^ ))  -  4 ,c
s . t .  P“(AI h,c) =  bftC +  (1 — 0 ) { C u{\Ih,c) — 6/,c)
and P“(4 ,c) =  bKc +  (1 -  /?') (C “(Jc) -  bh,c) . (3.4.6)
Maximising 3.4.6 gives
dC“(/„,c) dC“(A4,c) l
~ d i ^ r +  d \ i h.c -  -  - j '  • (3 A 7 )
If A =  0 and j3r =  /?, equation 3.4.7 reduces to the autarky situation, as in 
equation 3.2.14. In the case of full asset specificity, the foreign downstream 
firm cannot extract any productive value from the good produced by the 
domestic upstream firm, and will therefore never choose to relocate. The
equilibrium reduces to the free trade scenario.
In the limiting case that A =  1 and /?' =  /?, equation 3.4.7 reduces to
dC'{h,c) 1 . . . . .
dh,c 2/?' ( ' ’ }
Because of the convexity of Cu(Ih,c), the relocation of the downstream firm 
results in an increase in investment. By selling two units of the upstream
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good, the upstream producer is able to cover a larger portion of its fixed costs. 
Note that the result here is driven entirely by increasing returns to scale and 
that the bargaining power of the upstream firm has remained unchanged. 
The hold-up problem therefore persists.
In the likely case that the bargaining power of the upstream firm is in­
creased by the entry of the foreign downstream firm, i.e. (3' > (3, the upstream 
firm is able to capture a larger portion of the return on its investment regard­
less of the degree of asset specificity. As equation 3.4.7 shows, the convexity 
of Cu(Ih,c) implies that the first stage optimisation of upstream investment 
is such that
h , c  >  h , a  • (3.4.9)
Any welfare gains in this scenario can be attributed to an increase in the 
bargaining power of the upstream firm, reducing the scope for downstream 
opportunism. As hold-up is reduced, the upstream firm is now able to capture 
a larger share of the returns to its investment and will therefore invest more.
3.4.2 Efficiency
It was shown earlier that through a reduction in market power, trade of 
the downstream product improved allocative efficiency. As a result of the 
symmetric nature of the model and the absence of any barriers to trade, 
mobility of the downstream firm does not add any further allocative gains.
If one of the downstream firms decides to relocate, productive efficiency 
gains will be realised. These may operate through two distinct mechanisms, 
(i) As the upstream supplier can now sell two units, it is able to cover a 
larger portion of its fixed costs. The exploitation of increasing returns to 
scale provides an incentive for increased upstream investment, (ii) As in Hart 
and Tirole [55], the entry of the second downstream firm into the bargaining 
game (weakly) increases the bargaining power of the upstream firm. The
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upstream firm can therefore capture a (weakly) larger portion of the return 
to its investment than under trade or autarky. This stimulant of productive 
efficiency gains is inversely related to the magnitude of /?' — (3.
The appendix shows that the qualitative results are identical when we 
assume that upstream investment affects downstream variable costs.
3.4.3 Relocation
It remains to be analysed under what circumstances it would be profitable for 
the foreign downstream firm to relocate to the home country. Because of the 
symmetric nature of the model and the absence of any physical or man-made 
trade barriers, the demand faced by the downstream firm is independent of 
its location. Hence, the relocation decision of the downstream firm is only 
a function of the price of the upstream good. Recall from 3.4.2 that if the 
foreign firm chooses to relocate the price of the upstream good is given by
P“(AIu ) =  bu  +  (1 -  /?)(C “(A/c) -  bu ) . (3.4.10)
If the foreign downstream firm does not relocate and chooses to stay in the 
foreign country, the price it pays for the upstream good is given by
P “f e )  =  He + (1 -  P)(CU(If,c) -  h,e) ■ (3-4.11)
Comparing 3.4.10 and 3.4.11, three different effects can be identified. First, 
the price of the upstream good tends to be higher when the foreign firm 
relocates because of asset specificity. Since the investment of the domestic 
upstream firm is geared towards the domestic downstream firm, there is some 
sacrifice of productive value when it is redeployed to the foreign user. Second, 
increasing returns to scale dictate that the price of the upstream good is lower
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in 3.4.10 than in 3.4.11. If the foreign firm relocates, the domestic upstream 
firm supplies two units of its product. Since this enables the firm to cover 
a larger portion of its fixed costs, upstream investment will increase. This 
lowers upstream variable production costs and therefore also the price of the 
upstream good in 3.4.10. Third, relocation of the foreign downstream firm 
may increase the bargaining power of the domestic upstream firm. Although 
this lowers the share of the surplus that the downstream firm can capture, 
it also reduces hold-up and therefore increases upstream investment. This in 
turn lowers the variable production costs of the upstream firm and thus the 
price of the upstream good. The net effect of this third force on PU(A7/)C) is 
ambiguous.
The qualitative effects of trade in the downstream good and relocation of 
the downstream firm are summarised in table 3 . Z,
Table 3.2: The Determinants of the Price of the Upstream Good
Autarky Trade Capital Mob.
Bargaining power 0 P 0 ’ > 0
Benefit bj,a ty,t  < ^j,a bj,t =  bj,c
Investment p II Ih,c >  I Z t
p d p d
-7>°
p d  ^  p d  
7,< ^  7,a
p d  __ p d
r j, t  r 3,c
* 4 ,c > Ih,t if the downstream firm relocates.
Recall that j=h,f.
Relocation of the foreign firm is therefore more likely when asset speci­
ficities are smaller, increasing returns are larger, and when a change in the 
bargaining power of the upstream firm leads to larger savings in variable 
upstream production costs.13
13I t  w a s  s u g g e s t e d  e a r l i e r  t h a t  o n e  c a n  m o d e l  t h e  e n t r y  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  d o w n s t r e a m
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3.4.4 Gains from Capital M obility
The domestic upstream firm is obviously a clear beneficiary of the move to 
downstream firm mobility. The demand for its products has doubled rel­
ative to the free trade situation. As its bargaining power may also have 
gained strength, it can claim a larger portion of downstream profits which 
increases the return to its investments. In the present model, it is arbitrary 
which downstream firm will relocate. In a more general model, many vari­
ables would affect the outcome, including transportation costs, asymmetric 
demands and production costs.
Total revenue of the downstream firms will not be affected by firm mo­
bility compared to the free trade scenario. Since the price of the upstream 
good can only fall, downstream firms are (weakly) better off. If neither firm 
moves, the capital mobility scenario reduces to free trade as outlined in sec­
tion 3.3.1. Both firms will increase profits if either one relocates. Depending 
on the degree of asset specificity, the rise in profits may be smaller for the 
relocating firm than for the other downstream producer.
Since the price of the downstream product under capital mobility remains 
identical to the free trade price, consumers are in no way affected.14
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has made an attempt at a more formal identification of pro­
ductive efficiency gains arising from trade and economic integration. It is
firm as an outside option for the upstream firm. In the absence of any asset 
specificities it is then easy to show that the relocation of the foreign firm enables 
the domestic upstream firm to capture all the returns to its investment, i.e. c = 
P/c = k/,c = bh,c• In this set-up, the downstream firms will therefore never choose 
to relocate.
14In a general equilibrium model employment effects would have an impact on 
consumer welfare.
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argued that economic integration reduces the magnitude of the hold-up and 
thus increases investment. In contrast to many trade models, the present 
model suggests that trade is an imperfect substitute for factor mobility. The 
relocation of the downstream firm generates efficiency gains over and above 
those resulting from trade of the downstream product alone.
The results in this chapter were arrived at in a fairly simple symmet­
ric framework. The obvious question to raise is to what extent the results 
obtained might generalise.
A first extension would involve abandoning the symmetry between the 
two nations. Differing country sizes, asymmetric demands and production 
costs should be allowed for to capture many forces in the international econ­
omy. Although this may alter the magnitude of some of the forces in the 
model, the qualitative predictions will remain unaltered. One of the poten­
tial assets of such an asymmetric approach is that it will remove some of the 
ambiguities in the model. A closely related extension would centre around 
the issue of transportation costs and their effect on the location decisions 
of the downstream firm. As before, the framework presented in this paper 
would still be suitable, but the relative importance of the forces would be 
modified by the pervasiveness of physical and man-made trade barriers. A 
final extension would involve the identification of potential efficiency gains 
in other input markets, most notably labour. This will involve an analysis 
of the impact of economic integration on the bargaining position of trade 
unions.
A central assumption in the paper is the notion that the benefit of the 
upstream good to the downstream firm is independent of the level of invest­
ment. This greatly facilitates the analysis by separating the consumption and 
investment distortions. Relaxing this assumption, the appendix suggests the 
following results: (i) under autarky, privately optimal investment VS 
\ e s s  than socially optimal investment (ii)
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. r trade of the downstream good reduces the consumption as
well as the investment distortions, and (iii) downstream firm mobility may 
generate productive efficiency gains through the exploitation of increasing 
returns to scale or a reduction in the hold-up problem. The intuition behind 
all these results is presented in the appendix.
Although it makes no pretense at generality, it is hoped that this chapter 
has provided some insight into the formalisation of productive efficiency gains 
from trade that have long been recognised, but are yet to be extensively 
formalised. Using the tools of the new trade theory literature as well as 
recent developments in incomplete contracting theory, this chapter hopes to 
have shown that the modeling of endogenous imperfections in the market 
for intermediate inputs will generate further gains from trade. The next 
chapter makes an attempt to endogenise market imperfections in a second 
input market: the labour market. Further gains from trade will then be 
derived.
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3.6 Appendix
In the main text of this chapter, we considered the case where the investment 
of the downstream firm only affects the fixed costs of the upstream firm. 
Since the pricing decision of the downstream firm is based on variable costs 
only, this set-up enabled us to separate the consumption and investment 
distortions.
This appendix considers the case where the upstream investment decision 
enters the variable costs of both the upstream and the downstream firms. 
Since the benefit of the upstream good to the downstream firm is now de­
pendent on the upstream investment level, the consumption and investment 
distortions are no longer separable. The aim of this appendix is to sketch 
how this may alter the results of the model. We first solve the model under 
autarky and then discuss the implications of (i) free trade of the downstream 
good and (ii) downstream firm mobility.
3.6.1 Autarky
Bargaining
As in the main text of chapter 3, bargaining between the upstream and 
the downstream firm maximises
maxfi0 =  [(Pf -  Ct) X da -  P“]1- '3 K  -  C“f  . (A.1)
a
Although this maximisation problem is identical to 3.2.5, it should be noted 
that downstream variable costs C% are no longer exogenous and now depend 
on upstream investment levels.
Maximising A.l yields
P°(/«) =  ba + (1 -  0) (C“(/„) -  ba) , (A.2)
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where the benefit of the upstream good to the downstream firm is given by 
(Pjj — C fj  and depends on the upstream investment decision.
Second Stage: Downstream Product Prices
Taking the level of upstream investment as give, the second stage max­
imisation problem of the firm is
max n fPd a A a
subject to PJf
As before, prices are set as a markup over marginal costs where the size 
of the markup depends on preferences. The present maximisation differs 
from 3.2.10 in that Cf, and are affected by the first stage investment 
decision.
The first order condition of the downstream monopolist satisfies
K  =  ( ^ r y )  C*a = aaC t  (A.4)
where ea is the perceived elasticity of demand of the downstream firm. Under 
autarky, this is equal to /i, the elasticity faced by the industry as a whole. 
We denote the markup by a. As before, the subscript a indexes the autarky 
outcome.
First Stage: Upstream Investment
In the first stage, the upstream firm decides how much to invest, taking 
into account the effect that its investment will have on second stage prices 
of both the upstream and the downstream goods. It will maximise
m axn“(/„) =  P l - c r { l a) - l a
l a
subject to P“(/0) =  b(Ia) +  ( ! - /? )  (C”(/0) -  &(/„)) , (A.5)
=  (P‘ -  C M P ‘) -  P“
=  6a +  ( l- /3 ) (C “ - 6 0) . (A.3)
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Substituting in the constraint gives
max n(J„) = P [&(/„) -  Cu(Ia)) -  Ia , (A.6)la
where b(Ia) = (pd — Cd)X d. Maximising with respect to upstream investment 
yields a few direct effects and an indirect effect operating through b(Ia). A 
change in investment directly affects upstream profits through the change in 
production and investment costs. Further indirect effects are triggered since 
changes in production costs affect the price of the downstream good as well 
as product demand. However, the envelope theorem suggests that, if prices 
are set optimally in the second stage, the impact of a change in prices on 
b(Ia) can be ignored. We therefore only have to consider the direct effects. 
Maximising A.6 generates the following first order condition 
dC»{Ia) 1 „<&?•(/.)
~ H u  ( A J )
For simplicity, assume that Cd =  do — d\Ia. A.7 then reduces to
dC'(I.)_ I d 
dla ~ ~ p + x ' dl • (A-8)
Efficiency
In the socially optimal case, without any investment or consumption distor­
tions, j3 equals to unity and X d is at its socially optimal level. It was shown in
chapter 3 that investment falls as the bargaining power of the upstream firm
is reduced and hold-up increases. Condition A.8 shows that this result ex­
tends to the present scenario, where upstream investment affects the variable 
production costs of the downstream firm. However, A.8 suggests that in the 
present framework there is a further possible source of investment inefficien­
cies. The second term on the right hand side shows a positive relationship 
between downstream demand and upstream investment levels. Deviations of 
downstream demand from its socially optimal level has repercussions for the 
level of upstream investment.
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3.6.2 International Downstream product Trade
When two formerly closed economies commence trading relationships, the 
perceived elasticity of demand facing a downstream firm will fall. As shown 
in the main text of the chapter, the two downstream firms will reoptimise and 
will lower the markup charged. This will lead to an increase in downstream 
product demand. Hence, X f  > X%.
A.8 shows that the reduction in the consumption inefficiency, signified 
by the increase in downstream product demand, will also decrease the invest­
ment distortion. In contrast to the analysis in chapter 3, we here find that 
international trade reduces the investment distortion through an increase in 
downstream product demand.
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3.6.3 Capital M obility o f th e Dow nstream  Firm
In the main text of chapter 3 we derived that relocation of one of the down­
stream firms may lead to efficiency gains. These gains can either be at­
tributed to the exploitation of increasing returns to scale or through a reduc­
tion in the hold-up problem. In the framework presented in this appendix 
gains due to increasing returns to scale operate in a manner similar to that 
presented in chapter 3.
If j3, the share of the rents accruing to the upstream firm, increases then 
the first term on the right hand side of A.8 suggests that hold-up reduces. 
As the upstream firm is able to capture a larger share of the returns to 
its investment, it will invest more. In addition, A fall in product prices will 
increase downstream demand which in turn will further stimulate investment.
In contrast to the main text of chapter 3, this appendix has shown that 
international trade will reduce investment inefficiencies when upstream in­
vestment affects downstream production costs. The general efficiency results, 
presented in the main body of chapter 3, can easily be extended to a situation 
where upstream investment levels affect downstream production costs.
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Chapter 4
Economic Integration and the 
Unionised Labour Market
If A is success in life, then A equals X plus Y plus Z.
Work is X; y is play; and Z is keeping your mouth shut.
Albert Einstein, 1950.
4.1 Introduction
The impact of international trade on domestic labour markets has become a 
heated topic of debate in political circles and beyond. Ross Perot’s image of 
a giant sucking sound captivated at least a portion of his American audience. 
With the ever accelerating pace of economic integration, interest and concern 
has also spilled over to the academic community. A literature attempting to 
link sluggish and unequal OECD wage and employment growth to trade 
related factors is now emerging. The theoretical basis for this work is the 
perfectly competitive Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model where trade 
is based on differences in factor endowments. The message so far is mixed. 
Most authors agree that biased changes in technology explain at least part 
of the recent wage and employment trends in North America and Europe.
85
But this is where opinions bifurcate. Some of the recent literature suggests 
that international trade also has a significant role to play.1 Other authors 
contend that biased technological change is almost solely responsible for the 
observed labour market changes.2
Most of the recent literature on trade and labour markets has focussed 
on the globalisation phenomenon. There is no doubt that trade with ‘the 
South’ has increased in recent decades. In the European Union (EU), imports 
from newly industrialising economies (NIE’s) have risen from 5% of total 
imports in 1970 to a current 12%. However, Krugman [75] emphasises that 
although these imports have effectively emerged out of nothing, they still only 
compound to 1.3% of total EU GDP. This basic message is reiterated by a 
recent survey of a number of large Dutch firms.3 They report that their most 
menacing competitors do not originate in low-wage countries. Instead, they 
are based in other European Union countries, the United States and Japan.4 
The present study analyses the impact of these procompetitive effects of 
regionalisation on domestic labour markets.
In smoothly functioning labour markets, the new trade theory has demon­
strated that intra-industry trade will raise real wages. As international trade
1See Berman, Bound and Grilliches [2], Borjas, Freeman and Katz [14], 
Learner [82, 83], Murphy and Welch [98], Sachs and Shatz [113] and Wood [135].
2See Bhagwati and Dehejia [7], Krugman and Lawrence [76], and Lawrence and 
Slaughter [79]. Of course it is quite plausible that biased technological change is 
not autonomous and instead induced by trade related factors.
3More details can be found in De Volkskrant, 06/01/96; and The Economist, 
27/01/96.
4It would be an exaggeration to fully attribute the recent intensification of 
competition in both product and labour markets to international factors. In a 
recent study, Konings and Vandenbussche [70] suggest that between 1980 and 
1984, 58.8% of a sample of UK firms reported an intensification of competition 
from within the UK. 52% of the firms experienced an increase in competition from 
abroad. Between 1985 and 1989 the respective numbers for the same sample were 
49% and 69%. These data suggest that, whereas the firms facing an increase in 
UK competition is falling, the increase in foreign competition is rising rapidly.
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enables countries to benefit from economies of scale and lower unit costs, con­
sumer prices fall compared to autarky. In addition, the increase in foreign 
competition may squeeze price-cost markups further lowering product prices 
and increasing consumer welfare. An emerging literature suggests that these 
results may no longer hold when there are labour market imperfections.5 
Driffill and van der Ploeg [33] suggest that unions may set higher wages un­
der international trade since this enables them to bring about a reduction in 
the supply of goods and thus turn the terms of trade in their favour. Dan- 
thine and Hunt [28] show that integration can be viewed as a move towards 
the decentralisation of the bargaining structure. This may either increase 
or decrease real wages. An increase in wages is also demonstrated by Nay­
lor [100]. Another strand of the literature proposes that trade may lower 
wages. Huizinga [62] assumes that trade increases the elasticity of labour 
demand and proceeds to show that international market integration reduces 
inefficiencies. Driffill and van der Ploeg [34] suggest that the reduction in 
trade barriers lowers the domestic price of foreign goods. This increases 
competition and wages are lowered as the power of monopoly unions falls. 
Finally, Sprensen [119] shows how the impact of trade on labour markets 
depends on the exact labour market structure in the integrating economies.
The present chapter models the impact of economic integration on the 
labour market using a more integrated view of the labour market. We model
5An alternative literature examines the impact of labour market institutions 
on trade. Brander and Spencer [19] study the effect of unions on trade patterns 
and policy in a Cournot duopolistic product market. Grossman [44] investigates 
the wage and employment behaviour of a unionised sector that is confronted by 
an increase in international competition, modeled as a fall in prices. Mezzetti and 
Dinopoulos [96] build on this analysis and suggest that the results crucially depend 
on whether the union is wage or employment oriented. Zhao [136] studies the effect 
of FDI in a similar framework. Clemenz [27] examined the potential contribution 
of efficiency wage theorems to the study of international trade. Since our aim is to 
analyse the impact of globalisation trends on wages, we reverse the causality and 
study the effect of economic integration on a unionised labour market.
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the procompetitive impact that economic integration has on industrial struc­
ture, pricing strategies and the bargaining game between unions and firms. 
In contrast to the existing literature, the results are interpreted in a macroe­
conomic framework. We distinguish between different stages of economic 
integration. We first focus on the impact of trade and then consider a fur­
ther procompetitive effect formed by the threat of firm relocation. Foreign 
direct investment has surged in recent years. In the 1980s, outflows from 
OECD countries increased by 220% and inflows by 308%. It has been argued 
that these figures do not capture the full extent of the impact of the increased 
firm mobility on OECD economies. The threat of firm relocation, even in 
the absence of actual movement, may have a further effect on OECD labour 
markets. The perfectly competitive HOS model, in which trade and fac­
tor mobility are perfect substitutes, provides only limited insight into these 
questions. In addition to capturing the procompetitive impact of trade, the 
model developed in this paper also identifies the consequences of the threat 
of firm relocation. The effects of the actual relocation of firms are deferred 
to future work.
The remainder of this chapter can be outlined as follows. The firm level 
model is set out in the next section. The model combines techniques from 
the new trade theory with recent developments in New Keynesian macroe­
conomics. We first illustrate the equilibrium for a closed economy. We then 
introduce a second identical economy and analyse the impact of trade and 
the threat of firm mobility. This section is of a partial equilibrium nature and 
its primary aim is to identify the forces at work. In section 4.3, the model is 
aggregated to the industry level. We now examine the overall effects of trade 
and the threat of firm mobility taking into industry level effects. Welfare and 
distributional issues are then considered. Section 4.4 concludes.
88
4.2 Firm Level Equilibrium
4.2.1 The Basic M odel
Consumers
Suppose that utility takes the quasi-linear form
U = Z  +  X a ,a (4.2.1)
where
x =  £> i(‘T-1)/<' (4.2.2)
and 0 < a < 1. The composite X  consists of a number of horizontally differ­
entiated varieties X{. Z  represents a second homogeneous consumption good. 
The parameter a in 4.2.2, the elasticity of demand for a single differentiated 
product, is such that a > 1, where a smaller <j indicates a stronger consumer 
preference for variety per se. 4.2.2 is strictly concave. S  is a size parameter 
and is set to one under autarky.
We can think of the consumption decision as taking place in two stages: 
first the consumer considers how much of the composite to consume by solv­
ing the overall maximisation problem. Then the consumer decides how much 
of the different varieties to consume.
Solving the first stage maximisation problem, we find that demand is
X  = sp-*1 (4.2.3)
q
providing that income is no less than P X  =  P ^- 'S ,  where S  denotes size 
and fi =  the elasticity of demand faced by the industry as a whole with 
respect to the price index P, where
(4.2.4)
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where pi represents the price of the variety produced by downstream firm 
i. We restrict |/z| > 1, implying that the prices charged by the downstream 
monopolist always exceed marginal cost. Note that the demand for the hor­
izontally differentiated good is independent of income and the price of Z. 
As the price of X falls, the quantity demanded rises, but there is no income 
effect in the demand for X.
The second stage demand for any specific variety can now be derived. As 
in Dixit and Stiglitz [31], the demand for any particular variety is given by
» - * ( £ ) ' .  (4.2.5)
Firms
Consider the industrial sector of the domestic economy composed of i=l....M  
firms, where M is large but finite. The number of firms is fixed. Each firm 
produces a distinct variety of a horizontally differentiated good and faces 
an identical cost function. The determination of employment and wages at 
the firm level is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage workers 
and unions bargain over wages. Taking wages as given, in the second stage 
firms simultaneously set prices and employment levels. As usual, the game 
is solved backwards. In this section we hold wages constant and solve for the 
firm’s problem.
All firms face the following constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas pro­
duction function
Xi = N ? K l~a , (4.2.6)
where Ni is employment and K  denotes the predetermined capital stock of 
each firm. We suppose that capital is sunk so that employment is the only 
factor input endogenised in the model. Firms will choose to maximise profit
max II j =  PiXi -  WiNi , (4.2.7)Ni
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where Wi denote the nominal wage of workers in firm i. Maximising 4.2.7 
shows that labour is hired until its marginal revenue product equals the wage 
rate
where
Ki = 1 -----
e*
(4.2.9)
e* is the perceived elasticity of demand faced by firm i. This elasticity depends 
both on the elasticity of demand for a single differentiated product, denoted 
from here on as cr, and on the perceived effect of the action of one firm on 
the cumulative industry supply, p. Alternatively, p can be interpreted as 
the elasticity of demand when all firms raise prices simultaneously. When 
firm i changes its price while other prices remain unchanged, the elasticity 
of demand is given by e{. As in Smith and Venables [118], we obtain this 
perceived elasticity by substituting equations 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 into 4.2.5 and 
differentiating with respect to p*. Employing Bertrand conjectures, we then 
obtain
where s* denotes the market share of firm i. 4.2.10 shows that /c, the in­
verse of the price marginal cost mark-up, is nondecreasing in p  and a and 
nonincreasing in the market share of firm i, s*. k, can be interpreted as an 
indicator of product market competitiveness.
Wage Determination
In the previous section we solved for the second stage firm’s problem. Taking 
into account the impact of wages on second stage product demand, this 
section turns to first stage wage setting. Since product demand for any
ei =  a -  (a — p)si , (4.2.10)
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particular good depends on prices set by other firms, wage setting in one 
firm is affected by wage setting in other firms.
In modeling wage determination, we follow quite closely Layard et al. [81]. 
All domestic workers belong to one of the firm-level unions.6 The wage rate 
is viewed as the outcome of a bargaining process between a risk-neutral union 
and a firm, where both players aim to maximise their respective objectives. 
Bargaining is modeled using the axiomatic Nash solution. We ignore effort 
and assume that bargaining is over nominal wages only, leaving the right- 
to-manage to the firm. To guarantee an efficient bargain, assume that all 
variables are common information before the onset of the bargain.
We assume that unions aim to maximise rents.7 The union objective for 
the ith firm-union bargain is
Ui = Ni(Wi -  b) , (4.2.11)
where Ui denotes the utility function of union i, and b is the expected real 
income a union member obtains when he is not employed by the firm in 
question.8 We assume that no single firm is large enough to affect b. The
6If unions were sector rather than firm-specific, the labour demand faced would 
be less elastic. The negative employment consequence of increasing the wage rate 
is worse when there is only a wage increase in one firm than if the wage increase 
concerns all firms in the sector.
7See Rosen [111], de Menil [95] and Calvo [20]. We adopted rent maximisation 
for simplicity. There is considerable debate over the appropriate choice of a union’s 
maximand. However, most authors agree that unions maximise some function 
in which both the real wage and employment enter positively. We adopted the 
simplest function possible, but wish to emphasise that the fundamental results are 
not affected by the choice of more complicated union objective functions. For some 
empirical support, refer to Dertouzos and Pencavel [29].
8As in much of the literature, the union objective function differs from the 
consumers utility function. The indirect utility function following from the demand
1 __  __  Ot
specification of the model is given by Ui = 1~a S. The union member’s
utility is increasing in product wages and decreasing in in the price index P. Unless
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objective function 4.2.11 shows that the union only cares about the wage sur­
plus and the number of workers in the firm. The linearity of the union utility 
function implies that workers are risk-neutral. In the case that bargaining 
is unsuccessful, no production will take place and workers will receive the 
fallback income b. Since only surplus income in excess of b enters the utility 
function of the union, the union’s threat point equals zero.
The objective for each firm is to maximise profits as given by 4.2.7. If 
wage negotiations fail the firm has no outside option and its fallback income 
fl is zero.
In the first stage, each union and each firm bargain over wages, where 
both parties know that the solution is confined to the labour demand schedule 
generated in the second stage of the game. Assuming that the union gets a 
fraction (3 of the firm’s profits, the generalised Nash bargain is9
maxQi =  IIiC/f , (4.2.12)Wi
subject to second stage labour demand as given by 4.2.8. Since the threat 
points of both the union and the firm are zero, they do not affect the wage 
bargain.
Maximising 4.2.12 gives the following first order condition for the bar­
gained wage
dlogWj 0  B d N { 1 dYlj
dWi W i - b  NidWi H i  d W i '  )
the firm is very large, these price effects are secondary and objective function 4.2.11 
seems a reasonable - and definitely commonly used - approximation of reality.
9Although we chose to employ the axiomatic Nash Bargaining solution, the same 
result can be attained using the noncooperative approach due to Rubinstein [112]. 
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky [9] demonstrated that the generalised Nash 
Bargaining solution is the limit, as the time between bargaining rounds goes to 
zero of a noncooperative sequential offer bargaining game. One of the advantages 
of this noncooperative approach is that /? can be interpreted as the relative discount 
rates of the firm and the union. (3 will be lower the higher the relative discount 
rate of the union and can in principle be measured using economic information.
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After some algebraic manipulation and use of the envelope theorem, it 
can be shown that
- l
Wi = b 1 -  ^ , NtWi
CNW +
where the wage elasticity of employment, is given by
dNi Wi
€n \V = dWiNi =  [1 — aX]
- l
(4.2.14)
(4.2.15)
where A =  1 — p 1. Using second stage labour demand 4.2.8 reveals that the 
expected relative share of wages in the model is given by
= . (4.2.16)
l b  1 — a « j
With the Cobb-Douglas production function, wage and profit shares are in­
dependent of wages and prices. It is easily shown that labour’s share of 
total revenue is decreasing in both labour intensity (a) and product market 
competitiveness (k).
Substituting equations 4.2.15 and 4.2.16 into 4.2.14 gives the following 
expression for wages
(3 (1 — aKi) -f (1 — ckA)
Wi = 6 =  #  , (4.2.17)aKi (1 — aX) +  j3aX (1 — a/q)
where ip > 1 denotes the markup over the fallback income b. Note that 
the bargaining outcome is bordered by the competitive (j3 = 0) and the 
monopoly union (/? =  1) solution. An exercise in basic differentiation reveals 
that the wage rate is increasing in the bargaining power of the union (3 and 
decreasing in product market competitiveness k and in A.
4.2.2 Autarky
Under autarky, all firms face an identical cost function and we can concen­
trate on the symmetric equilibrium, with pi = p, X{ = x , Ni =  TV, Wi — W ,
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Hi — U, Ui = U and s* =  s, Vi. Equation 4.2.3 then reduces to
P = ( S M ) ^ p .  (4.2.18)
Equilibrium firm level employment can be calculated by substituting 
equations 4.2.18 and 4.2.5 into the first order condition 4.2.8. This generates
f W K i
N = K \ - ^ m m e r >  • ( 4 -2 - 1 9 )
where Wi is given by equation 4.2.17. It is straight-forward to show that firm 
level employment is an increasing function of market size, labour intensity 
and product market competitiveness and a decreasing function of the wage 
rate.
4.2.3 International Trade
We proceed to analyse the effect of international trade on the bargained real 
wage and employment. The present section identifies the basic forces at the 
firm level. A more general analysis of the industry equilibrium follows in the 
next section of the paper.
For simplicity we assume that there exist two economies of the type just 
outlined in section 4.2.1. To highlight the main issues of the paper, suppose 
that both countries are identical in all respects: they have identical market 
size, tastes, technologies and factor endowments. Furthermore, assume that 
there exist no physical, cultural or institutional transportation costs between 
the two nations. We treat the two countries as a single integrated market, 
where competitors set prices for the combined market rather than setting 
them independently for each nation.10 In what follows we will analyse the
10 The segmented markets perception would introduce a further strategic incen­
tive for international trade. For an exposition of reciprocal dumping see the clas-
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impact of trade as a change in the market size parameter S. Since the two 
countries are identical in all respects, S  will double from 1 under autarky to 
2 under international trade.
Allocative Efficiency
Since in equilibrium all firms will be of the same size, the perceived elasticity 
of demand in 4.2.10 can can be rewritten as
e = a -  (a -  n ) - ^  . (4.2.20)
This shows that international trade reduces the relative market share of 
a typical manufacturing firm thereby increasing the perceived elasticity of 
demand faced by each firm. As relatively more firms are now in the industry, 
the effect of the action of one individual firm on cumulative industry supply 
falls. Since producers face a relatively more competitive environment, the 
marginal cost mark-up falls reducing allocative inefficiencies.
It is now straight-forward to show that /c, the inverse of the price marginal 
cost markup, increases as the economies start trading. Substituting 4.2.20 
into 4.2.9 it follows that
d,K dn de (a — //) 1
dS de dS e2 S 2M
> 0 , (4.2.21)
since a, the elasticity of demand for a single differentiated product always 
exceeds /x, the elasticity of demand faced by the industry as a whole. Inter­
national trade therefore lowers the markup that firms charge.
sic paper by Brander and Krugman [18]. A discussion of the integrated versus 
segmented market perception and its impact on trade theory can be found in 
Markusen [90] or Venables [130].
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Wage Determination
The impact of international trade on the bargained wage is given by differ­
entiating 4.2.17 with respect to S, yielding
dW dW dn 
dS ~  dK dS
=  ______-<*/?(l~aA)26_____  ( g - p )  1 < Q (4_
(a/c(l — aX) +  a p \ ( l  — ax,))2 e2 S 2M
As international trade increases competition, a higher k decreases markups. 
This in turn depresses the excess rents that are to be divided between capital 
and labour, thus lowering wages.
There is some empirical evidence on the relationship between market con­
centration and wage levels. Stewart [124] finds a strong association between 
product market power and the ability of unions to sustain wage differentials. 
Borjas and Ramey [15] find that increased imports have eroded rents formerly 
earned by US producers. This has translated into reduced wage premiums. 
In more recent work [16] they argue that the impact of foreign competition 
on the labour market depends on the market structure of the industry. In 
highly concentrated industries imports have lowered the wages of less-skilled 
workers. The impact on the wage structure is much smaller when a compet­
itive industry is penetrated. An empirical study by Katz and Summers [65] 
estimates that, after adjustment for skill levels, wages in export-intensive in­
dustries were 11 per cent above average, whereas wages in import-intensive 
industries are 15 per cent below average.
Employment
To analyse the impact of international trade on employment, we substitute 
the price index into the profit maximising condition 4.2.8 and differentiate
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with respect to S. This gives
dN
dS
where dW /dS  is given by 4.2.22 and is negative. The effect of trade on em­
ployment can thus be subdivided into a direct and two indirect effects, where 
the latter operate through the real wage rate and the markup. The direct 
effect suggests that factor demand increases with international trade. The 
construction of the price index 4.2.18 reflects the notion that consumers value 
variety per se. Hence, as the number of varieties available to consumers in­
creases, firms face a higher demand for their products. This in turn translates 
into an increase in the firm’s demand for labour.
The first indirect effect operates through the markup k . A s  international 
trade alters the perceived elasticity of demand of firms, they lower their 
markup and the prices charged to consumers. This increases product demand 
which translates into an increase in the firm’s demand for labour.11 The 
reduction in distortions in the product market brings the economy closer to 
a first-best outcome and raises firm level employment. The second indirect 
effect operates through first stage wage determination. As the competitive 
discipline imposed by international trade reduces product market rents, the 
Nash maximands are altered. Since there are fewer rents to be shared, the 
bargained wage is lowered as in 4.2.22. Lower wage rates spur each firm 
to increase their labour intake thus increasing firm level employment. The 
direct and indirect effects are all positive and thus reinforce one another.
n Note that an increase in S also lowers the price index P thereby reducing both 
product and labour demand. However, this turns out to be a second order effect.
dN  dN  dW dN  dn 
+  — —  +dS
N
dW  dS
1 - f i
dK dS
1 — aX
1 1 dW'
(1 -  <t)/iS +  K W  dS > 0 (4.2.23)
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4.2.4 Firm M obility
We now assume that each firm has the option to relocate to the other coun­
try. Labour remains immobile. Recall that we have assumed away any trans­
portation costs, so that relocation is only a function of differences in labour 
costs. If a firm relocates, it has to move its capital and incurs a cost r)K, 
where 77 > 0 and K is the capital stock of the firm. We analyse the impact 
of unrestricted international firm mobility (foreign direct investment) on the 
domestic economy.
In the presence of international firm mobility, each firm now has the 
outside option to relocate abroad. The fallback threat-point of the firm then 
equals the potential profits that a firm could make if it relocated. Let the 
profits at this disagreement point be denoted by ft. The firms incremental 
utility from bargaining is given by II — fl. The union’s utility level continues 
to be given by 4.2.11 and its fallback utility level remains at zero. The 
generalised Nash bargain is now
Differentiating 4.2.24 shows that the bargained wage must now satisfy
(4.2.24)
aiogfi _ 0 0 dN  1 a n - n
dW  ~  W  - b  + N d W  + n - n  dW  '
It can then be shown that
(4.2.25)
- 1
(4.2.26)
Since the two countries are identical in all respects, we know that
n = n -  r)K , (4.2.27)
where rjK denote the moving costs incurred by a relocating firm. Note that 
ft is always non-negative. If rjK > II, the firm still has the outside option
to shut down so that II =  0. The outcome then reduces to the free trade 
situation. In what follows we shall therefore assume that II > r)K so  that 
the value of the outside option is strictly positive.
To solve for the axiomatic Nash bargain, we substitute 4.2.27 into 4.2.26 and 
obtain
W  =
(1 — an) +  ax, (1 — aX)
aK, (1 — aA) +  ^ /3aX  (1 — an)
b = £b , (4.2.28)
Comparing 4.2.28 to 4.2.17 shows that under firm mobility the coefficient 
/3 is replaced by ^ 0 .  Since rjK/U < 1, this implies that firm mobility 
effectively reduces the share of the rents accruing to the union.
So far we have focused on the relocation problem of the first firm. Since 
the identical cost structure implies that no firm will actually relocate, all firms 
see themselves as facing the problem outlined above and general equilibrium 
considerations can be ignored. It should be emphasised that the the results 
in this section are entirely driven by the threat of a firm to relocate. No 
actual relocation is taking place.
Because of the symmetry of the model we know that ft < II. This 
implies that the outside option is nonbinding. The relocation threat of the 
downstream firm is therefore not credible. The appendix shows that one of 
the properties of the axiomatic Nash Bargaining solution is that the fall-back 
threat point still affects the bargaining outcome, even when it is nonbinding. 
However, this is not the case for the noncooperative bargaining model of 
Rubinstein [112]. The results of this section do therefore not extend to that 
solution concept.
Wage Pressure
In the previous section we suggested that under Nash bargaining, the threat 
of firm relocation provides an outside option to the firm. Equation 4.2.28
100
showed that this can effectively be analysed as a reduction in /?, the bar­
gaining power of the union. To analyse the impact of capital mobility on 
employment, we therefore differentiate the profit maximising condition with 
respect to /?, giving
dN  dN  dW
dp dW  dp
1 N  
1 - a X W
k ( 1 — a/t)( 1 — aX)J
(/c(l — aA) +  PX(1 — an))
< 0 . (4.2.29)
Since unions bargain over wages only, there is no direct effect. The indirect 
effect operates through first stage wage bargaining. The relocation threat 
of firms effectively reduces the share of the rents that workers are able to 
capture. As bargained wages fall, firm level employment increases.
The above analysis provides an economic argument for some union s ef­
forts to form crossborder labour unions. Even when international wage levels 
are identical, the threat of firm relocation harms the bargaining power of the 
unions. Cross-border unions can remove a firm’s outside option. Although 
this is obviously desirable from a worker’s perspective, it is harmful from an 
efficiency perspective as factor market distortions are not reduced.
A paper by Driffill and van der Ploeg [33] addresses precisely this issue. In 
the face of increased international competition between firms, do unions have 
an incentive to go international as well and cooperate with unions abroad? 
They find that if monopoly trade unions remain concerned with national 
rather than international objectives, the welfare of the union members may 
be lowered as their wages are bid downwards.
4.3 Industry Equilibrium
The analysis above focused on the effects of international trade and firm mo­
bility in a paxtial-equilibrium firm level model. In this section, we aggregate
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the firm level results, following closely Layard, Nickell and Jackman [81]. In 
doing so, we will employ wage-setting and price-setting schedules to situate 
the economy-wide equilibrium.12
4.3.1 Autarky
In an economy wide equilibrium, the expected fallback income b is no longer 
exogenous. The interaction between b and the unemployment rate u now has 
to be considered. We model b as follows
b= ( l - u ) W  + uB  , (4.3.1)
where W  denotes the outside wage and B  exogenous non-labour income. 
Because all bargaining firms and unions are identical, it follows that
Wi =  W  = W  V i.  (4.3.2)
Combining equations 4.2.17, 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 yields the following aggregate 
wage (WS) equation
(4-3'3>
where 'ip is the markup over the fallback income b. It can easily be shown 
that for -0 > 1, the wage equation is negatively sloped in W-u-space. At 
low levels of unemployment, unions feel that they are in a strong bargaining 
position and demand higher levels of nominal wages for given prices. The 
concavity of the WS schedule implies that, as unemployment rises, wages fall 
at an increasing rate. It is straight forward to show that a higher non-labour 
income B  and a higher markup 'ip shift the wage curve to the right.
The second relationship pinning down general equilibrium is the labour 
demand equation. This is given by the aggregate version of equation 4.2.19
12For a treatment of this approach see Carlin and Soskice [21], Layard, Nickell 
and Jackman [81] and Lindbeck [85].
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1 — n <7 — ii (ot —1)(1 — ti) u(a — l) — a u(a — l) — a
W  = a K , S T ^ M T ^ K — * L V  (1 -  u) V , (4.3.4)
where N  =  (1 — u)L and L represents the exogenously given manufacturing 
labour force. The literature sometimes refers to 4.3.4 as the price-setting 
(PS) schedule, since prices are set as a markup over labour costs. The price 
setting equation gives the ‘feasible’ wage that price-setters are willing to 
concede to given a certain level of unemployment u. The PS schedule is 
positively sloped in W-u-space, implying that the markup rises with the 
level of economic activity. The convexity of the PS schedule suggests that it 
does so at a decreasing rate.
Combining the price and the wage equation allows us to solve for the 
equilibrium industry wide levels of unemployment and wages.
4.3.2 International Trade
As before, we model international trade as an increase in the market size 
S. As increased competitiveness reduces product market rents, the markup 
that a union can attain for its workers falls. Differentiating 4.3.3 shows that 
international trade will induce a downward shift of the WS curve.
Since the feasible real wage is increasing in S, 4.3.4 shows that interna­
tional intra-industry trade shifts the PS schedule up.13 As the markup falls, 
product prices will be lower and demand will increase. To meet this increase 
in demand, firms will want to hire more labour shifting the PS schedule up. 
This is depicted in figure 4.1.
International trade will therefore generate an unambiguous reduction in 
unemployment. On the factor market side, as the bargained wage falls, labour
13Note that as S increases k also increases shifting up the PS curve further.
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demand increases. This is reinforced by the effects on the product market, 
where lowered product prices raise labour demand by firms.14
The overall effect on wages is ambiguous. There are two opposing forces 
operating through the product and factor markets. In the factor market, 
reduced markups will lead to lower product market rents translating into 
a lower equilibrium real wage. However, increased demand in the product 
market will raise labour demand and thus increases wages. The net effect of 
trade on wages is therefore ambiguous.15
Welfare
Trade-induced increases in competition reduce both product and labour mar­
ket distortions. Although the effect on wages is ambiguous, employment un­
ambiguously increases as a consequence of international trade. Gains from 
trade are attained as both product and factor market distortions are reduced 
and the economy is moved closer to a first-best outcome.
We are able to make some inferences about the distribution of the gains 
from trade. The firms unambiguously lose. As product market rents are 
dissipated through increased international competitiveness, the rents to be 
shared between firms and workers fall. Furthermore, the Cobb-Douglas tech­
nology implies that the relative share of the rents is given by
n  1 — an
W N  an (4.3.5)
This demonstrates that the firm will only be able to claim a relatively smaller 
share of the rents when product market competitiveness increases. It is 
therefore hit twice. To examine the impact on the income of the workers,
14Mathematically this result can be confirmed by equating 4.3.4 and 4.3.3 and 
implicitly differentiating with respect to S.
15 Implicit differentiation of the equilibrium condition defined by the PS and WS 
curves does not resolve this ambiguity.
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we have to make the following distinctions. The workers who were initially 
unemployed and found employment because of international trade will be 
better off. The welfare of those who remain unemployed is unaffected: they 
continue to receive the same welfare payment B. Finally, the individuals who 
were employed both before and after trade may either be better or worse off. 
As outlined above, the effect of an increase in S on the bargained wage is 
ambiguous.
Varying the Number of Firms
One possible limitation of the analysis presented here is that the number of 
firms is kept fixed. If economic integration lowers profits, it is reasonable to 
expect that some firms will leave the industry. We will briefly outline the 
effects of such behaviour.
First, as fewer firms remain in the industry, the perceived elasticity of 
demand for each firm will be less. This will increase the markups that firms 
charge over production costs. As more rents are generated, unions will be 
able to bargain higher wages for their workers. This will result in an upward 
shift of the WS curve. As long as the number of firms in the market under 
trade is greater than under autarky, international trade will still result in a 
net leftward shift of the WS curve as in figure 4.1. However, the magnitude 
of the shift will be smaller the more firms leave the industry. Wages and 
unemployment will then decrease by relatively less.
Introducing a variable number of firms will also have an impact on labour 
demand. The effect here is ambiguous. Although there are fewer firms in 
the market when the economy trades, the remaining firms all face a boost in 
product demand. This will translate into an increase the number of workers 
that the firm wishes to hire. If there is a net increase in labour demand, 
the PS curve will shift to the left by more than depicted in figure 4.1. A 
net decrease in labour demanded will shift PS1 to the right. Unfortunately,
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the net effects on wages and employment are ambiguous. If labour demand 
falls the reduction in unemployment, already dampened by the above upward 
shift of the WS curve, is suppressed further.
4.3.3 Firm M obility
Condition 4.2.28 illustrated that the introduction of capital mobility de­
creases the surplus income over labour costs. It was argued that the effect 
of capital mobility on the bargained wage can be analysed as a decrease in 
/?, i.e. the share of the rents that the union can claim.
The aggregation process generates the following industry WS schedule
where £ represents the new markup with the threat of firm mobility. Differ­
entiation shows that the markup £ is increasing in /3. Hence, since mobility 
leads to increased wage pressure the WS curve will shift downwards reducing 
unemployment and lowering wages. Unlike wage setters, price setters are 
only indirectly affected by the potential for firm mobility. As the level of 
economic activity increases, the mark-up of prices over wages falls as shown 
by the movement along the PS curve. This is summarised in figure 4.2. We 
thus observe unambiguous decreases in unemployment and the bargained 
wage rate.
Welfare
Productive efficiency gains are attained as increased wage pressure reduces 
distortions in the labour markets. Although there are net gains, the distribu­
tion of these gains will be uneven. Some formerly unemployed workers will 
be better off since the increased wage pressure reduces the unemployment
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rate. Workers who were employed both before and after the threat of firm 
mobility will encounter lower wages.
It is interesting to note that the share of the profits accruing to the 
union and the firm only depends on the labour intensity a  and product 
market competitiveness /c. The threat of firm relocation does not alter this 
distribution.
FDI and International Trade
To analyse the joint effects of international trade and the threat of foreign 
direct investment, the effects in figures 4.1 and 4.2 should be superimposed. 
This suggests a definite decrease in unemployment. As in the case of inter­
national trade, the impact on wages is ambiguous. However, when there also 
exists a threat of firm relocation, a drop in wages is relatively more likely 
than under trade alone.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
Over the past 15 years, an extensive literature has emerged reanalysing 
the entirety of trade theory using a framework of product market imper­
fections and increasing returns to scale. So far, factor market distortions 
have been largely ignored. However, their prominence in most economies is 
indisputable. This paper can be viewed as part of a wider goal to study the 
interactions between economic integration and factor market distortions. In 
the case of a unionised labour market, we have derived gains from interna­
tional trade and firm mobility. We also suggested that the distribution of 
these gains may be uneven.
In contrast to much of the recent theory on trade and wages, the above 
analysis suggests that international trade and the threat of firm relocation 
may affect employment and wages in the labour market. Although unions are
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fairly powerful in most of Europe, this is not the case in the United States. 
More formal work is needed to determine whether the above results extend 
to other theories of wage determinations under market imperfections. The 
primary candidate is the efficiency wage theory.
An obvious but very important extension to the present paper is the in­
troduction of international cost asymmetries and transportation costs. Some 
firms will then decide to relocate and the impact on the labour market and 
aggregate welfare will diverge from the present scenario. In such a framework, 
the location decision of the firm can be explicitly modeled using auctioning 
theory.
A further interesting extension would endogenise the capital stock. Add­
ing a further stage to the bargaining game would lead to a hold-up problem 
as described by Grout [47] and Manning [89]. In the absence of binding con­
tracts, the union would first signal a low wage to promote capital investment 
by the firm. Once the capital stock has been installed, the union will demand 
a higher wage in the next stage. Since the firm is unable to capture the full 
returns to its investment, its optimal strategy will be to underinvest in its 
capital stock. In such a scenario, further welfare gains may be derived as eco­
nomic integration changes the incentive and bargaining structure. Chapter 
3 of this thesis has demonstrated this for the intermediate input market.
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4.5 Appendix
This appendix contrasts the treatment of outside options in the axiomatic 
Nash and the noncooperative Rubinstein bargaining models. This will high­
light that the results in section 4.4 do not exterd to a noncooperative frame­
work.
4.5.1 Axiom atic Nash Bargaining
Consider the solution to the generalised Nash bargain16
This shows that the payoff to the firm is always increasing in its fall-back 
threatpoint. The analysis in the main text of the chapter is based on this 
relationship.
4.5.2 The Rubinstein Bargaining M odel
When there are non-binding outside options, the solution to the noncooper­
ative bargaining model by Rubinstein [112] differs from the outcome of the
16The exposition in this section follows closely Booth [13, ch.5].
m a x Q =  ( I I - I I )  U p (A.1)
subject to II <  II. Assuming that all surplus is exhausted we can construct 
the following Lagrangian
£  =  /?lntf +  l n ( I I - n )  +  A ( l - t f - I I )  . (A.2)
Taking the first order conditions and making some basic substitutions yields
(A.3)
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axiomatic Nash model outlined above. The outside option of relocation is 
not a credible threat. The firm is always better off to stay and try to ‘rene­
gotiate’. Since the solution to the Rubinstein game is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium, it is not affected by such noncredible threats.
Hence, whenever fi < II, the outside option will not alter the equilib­
rium bargain between the firms and the unions in the Rubinstein case. The 
symmetric model in this chapter therefore dictates that the mere threat of 
relocation does not increase wage pressure.
Note that in the presence of international labour cost asymmetries the 
outside option may become a binding constraint for the firm. Whenever 
ft > n , the bargain struck between the worker and the firm will give the firm 
fl, the amount just equal to its outside option. This will imply that workers 
need to accept a reduction in wages. When wages fall below b, the expected 
real income that a union member obtains when not employed by the firm, 
the firm will choose to relocate.
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Figure 4.1: International Trade
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Figure 4.2: Firm Mobility
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Remarks
Oh, most lame and impotent conclusion!
Shakespeare, Othello, 1604.
5.1 Deriving Gains from Trade
One of the primary aims of this dissertation was to explore the benefits of in­
corporating factor market imperfections into the formal analysis of economic 
integration. Postponing other questions for future work, chapters 3 and 4 of 
this thesis focused on the derivation of gains from trade when factor markets 
are distorted. Because of the surge in foreign direct investment during the 
eighties and early nineties, we considered both the impact of product trade 
as well as that of firm mobility. In contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, 
we found that trade in goods and firm mobility are not perfectly substi­
tutable. Below, we briefly recapitulate the main results of chapters 3 and 4 
and suggest some extensions.
Chapter 3 identified gains from trade in the presence of hold-up. In 
the case of a bilateral monopoly in a closed economy, it was shown that 
the privately optimal investment level is less than the socially optimal level,
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leading to a productive inefficiency. The main conclusion of chapter 3 was 
that firm mobility is likely to reduce the extent of this productive inefficiency. 
We attributed this to (i) increasing returns to scale and/or (ii) an increase in 
the bargaining power of the investor, which enabled him to capture a larger 
share of the returns thus reducing hold-up.
For simplicity, the model in the main text in chapter 3 was set up so that 
productive and allocative inefficiencies could be separated. The appendix 
to chapter 3 considered an alternative set-up, where the consumption and 
investment distortions were intertwined. It was then suggested that, even 
in the absence of firm mobility, free trade may be sufficient in reducing the 
investment distortions.
As in much of the incomplete contracting literature, the industrial struc­
ture and production technology employed in chapter 3 were highly specific. 
Furthermore, since one easily runs into technical problems with multi-person 
bargaining games, the set-up of the model makes it very difficult to consider 
the tradability of the upstream good. A possible alternative modeling tech­
nique would involve the use of double marginalisation as first introduced by 
Spengler [123]. The following set-up may be worth exploring in future work.
Analogous to chapter 3, suppose a vertical production structure with 
one upstream and one downstream firm. Because of its market power, a 
monopoly producer of an intermediate good will then charge the downstream 
firm a price in excess of production costs. However, the downstream firm is 
a monopolist in the product market and will thus charge a further markup 
over costs. This leads to a double price distortion, occurring because each 
firm adds its own price-cost margin at each stage of production. Since the 
price of the good to the downstream firm exceeds the production cost to the 
upstream firm, demand of the upstream good will be too low relative to the
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socially optimal level. Similarly, since consumers are also charged a price 
in excess of costs, production of the downstream firm will also be less than 
the socially optimal level. In the closed economy case, there thus exist both 
productive and allocative inefficiencies.
When economies are symmetric, free trade will increase the number of 
upstream and downstream firms in the market. Using either Bertrand or 
Cournot competition, it can then be shown that trade will reduce the mark­
ups over marginal production costs. If only the downstream good is tradable, 
the allocative inefficiency will be reduced, but the productive inefficiency will 
persist. If both the upstream and the downstream goods are tradable, both 
inefficiencies will lessen. In the case of Bertrand competition with homoge­
nous products, free trade of both the upstream and the downstream good 
with only one other country is sufficient for removing all inefficiencies. Al­
though this set-up is slightly different from the hold-up problem in chapter 3, 
it is more general - and definitely more tractable - and conveys very similar 
ideas.
Chapter 4 identified gains from trade when the labour market is union­
ised. Whenever unions have some bargaining power, workers will be paid 
wages in excess of their marginal products. The size of this markup depends 
on a variety of factors, including the market power of the firm. Hence, as 
international trade increases the number of firms in the market, the elasticity 
of demand perceived by each firm increases. The market power of firms then 
falls and so do the wages of workers. Since the difference between wages and 
the value of the marginal product of labour is suppressed, efficiency increases.
Chapter 4 also showed that the threat of firm mobility can effectively be 
analysed as a reduction in the bargaining power of unions. However, when 
countries are symmetric, this result only holds under axiomatic Nash bar­
gaining. The results do not hold when the cooperative Rubinstein bargaining 
solution is used. Yet, it is still hoped that it provides some motivation for
115
the recent emergence at a European level of crossborder labour unions.
The analysis in chapter 4 calls for two obvious extensions. First, the rel­
ative importance of unions varies greatly across economies. Although they 
are quite powerful in large parts of Europe, this is not the case in other con­
tinents. Other theories of imperfectly competitive labour markets therefore 
also need to be explored. A fairly large number of models of wage determina­
tion suggest some relationship between market power and wages, including 
expense preference models and some versions of efficiency wages.1 They will 
thus be particularly suitable candidates for further work. A second exten­
sion would analyse the impact of - the threat of - foreign direct investment 
on wage setting. In the context of the present public policy debate, it would 
be particularly interesting to consider an asymmetric set-up, where domestic 
firms are faced with the possibility of relocation to low-wage countries. It 
may be possible to model the location decision of a firm as the outcome of 
an auction with labour unions in various countries.
5.2 Measuring Gains from Trade
Although the existence of procompetitive gains from trade has long been 
recognised by academic economists and practitioners alike, only few attempts 
have been made to measure these gains. The objectives of chapter 2 of this 
thesis was to begin to bridge this gap and to empirically assess the importance 
of procompetitive gains from trade.
Chapter 2 presented an analysis of the impact of trade liberalisation on 
2400 Mexican firms between 1984 and 1990. Two main conclusions emerged 
from this chapter. First, we found a negative correlation between the open­
ness of the economy and the markups charged by firms. In the first part
xSee for instance Smirlock and Marshall [116], Nickell, Vainiomaki and Wad- 
hwani [103] and Layard, Nickell and Jackman [81].
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of the sample period the economy was almost completely closed to interna­
tional trade. We estimated that prices exceeded marginal costs by an average 
of 34 per cent before 1988. In the second part of the period, the relevant 
figure dropped to 23 per cent. This was shown to be a statistically signif­
icant decrease. The second main finding in chapter 2 was that total factor 
productivity grew faster in the final few years of the sample period. This 
was positively correlated with various measures of trade openness. We also 
estimated that average increases in total factor productivity after 1987 were 
three times as high as the pick-up in GDP. As pointed out earlier, one com­
plicating factor in our study is the fact that trade liberalisation coincided 
with the recovery of the Mexican economy from a deep recession.
Since the data set used in chapter 2 was a balanced panel, it was not 
suitable for analysing the impact of foreign direct investment on productivity 
and markups. A more comprehensive identification of the precise mechanisms 
through which welfare gains are attained would decompose the impact of 
economic integration into effects due to international trade and those due 
to foreign direct investment. We hope to be able to find data sets that will 
enable us to pursue such work in the future.
Although other studies have aimed to empirically analyse the impacts of 
trade and economic integration on economies, we believe our study is partic­
ularly insightful and comprehensive. The opening of the Mexican economy 
is about as close to a controlled experiment as an international economist 
can hope to get. Whereas the economy was still virtually closed in the mid 
1980s, at present it is a member of a free trade agreement. Not only is the 
‘experiment’ unique, we also believe that the data set has the potential to 
be particularly enlightening. It has both breadth and depth, covering a sub­
stantial number of firms and providing detailed information about each firm 
in the sample. We hope that this will provide one building step in finally en­
abling international trade theorists to identify more accurately the channels
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through which gains from trade and economic integration occur in the late 
twentieth century.
5.3 Factor Market Imperfections in Future 
Work
It was suggested in the introduction that the long-run aim of the research 
presented in this thesis is to examine whether endogenising factor market 
imperfections can provide some insight into recent developments in interna­
tional economic relations. The author thus hopes to move beyond the mere 
formalisation of gains from trade - as has been the topic of this thesis. It 
therefore seems appropriate to conclude with a sampling of issues to be ad­
dressed in future work. Two common questions underline all the work: How 
do economic integration and technological change interact? What is their 
impact on the labour market? The incorporation of factor market imperfec­
tions will be central in addressing these questions. We motivate the research 
with a brief description of some recent economic trends.
In the past fifteen years demand for less-skilled workers has fallen in the 
developed world. In the United States, real hourly wages of the less-educated 
have dropped by as much as 25 per cent since 1979. In most European 
countries, where wages are more rigid, the relative decline in demand of less- 
skilled workers has instead been reflected in an increase in unemployment 
rates of less-skilled workers. Over the same period, the global economy has 
grown at an unprecedented rate. Because of their parallel timing, it has been 
suggested by a number of (often influential) people that there exists a causal 
link between globalisation trends and the developments in the labour market.
The literature that has emerged in the past few years has highlighted 
time and again that the mere concordance of globalisation with increased 
inequality does not imply that one caused the other. Rather than blaming
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globalisation, a number of papers point the finger at technological change, 
which has allegedly been particularly biased against unskilled workers in the 
past fifteen years. Academic economists have thus divided themselves into 
two camps: the trade versus technology battle is presently raging!2
Depending on the conviction of their authors, most papers in the existing 
literature model either trade or technology as an exogenous labour market 
shock. They then proceed to analyse the impact of this shock and judge 
their model by how well its predictions match the observed trends. How­
ever, treating trade and technological change as independent factors is not 
very realistic. The rate and direction of technological change is likely to be 
affected by developments in the international economy. While trade affects 
technological change, the reverse causation is also indisputable. As technol­
ogy lowers transportation and communication costs, the degree of economic 
integration rises.
In future work, I would like to investigate these links between techno­
logical change and economic integration using endogenised factor market 
imperfections. The first question I propose to answer is how trade and FDI 
affect technological change. A small macroeconomic literature has arisen 
suggesting that integration may increase the long-run growth rate.3 Instead, 
I plan to focus on the microeconomic principles of firm behaviour rather 
than to engage in a macroeconomic analysis. In the presence of factor mar­
ket imperfections such as hold-up, how do international trade and increased 
competition alter firm incentives? Are the payoffs to R&D and technological 
change affected? What is the impact on the quality level of products?4
2Wes [133] provides an overview of this debate.
3Rivera-Batiz and Romer [110] and Grossman and Helpman [46] suggest that 
economic integration, via the spread of ideas across international borders, can 
trigger a permanent acceleration of economic growth.
4The models in this thesis all assumed horizontal differentiation. I intend to 
do further experimentation with theories of vertical product differentiation. Gab-
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I would also like to investigate how technological change affects inter­
national trade and the location decisions of firms. As technological change 
reduces transportation costs, international trade flows will increase. With 
plummeting international communication costs, technological change also af­
fects the location decisions of multinational corporations. I intend to moti­
vate the recent rise in the so-called vertical FDI, where various stages of the 
production process are geographically disaggregated. Although horizontal 
foreign direct investment is still more important quantitatively than foreign 
direct investment, its relative importance is falling.
One of the important implications of chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis is 
that, in contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade and firm mobility are 
no longer perfect substitutes. As this is a common result under any type of 
market imperfections, a literature trying to motivate FDI is rapidly emerg­
ing. Since Dunning [35], the multinational enterprise is generally analysed 
in a framework of ownership, location and internalisation advantages. As 
an attempt to identify the links between technological change - modeled as 
falling transportation costs - and the location decisions of firms, I would 
like to explore to what extent internalisation advantages are the motivation 
behind the recent increases in vertical FDI. I intend to use the contractual 
approach - including the hold-up framework - as outlined in chapter 3.5 The 
main question of interest is whether falling transportation costs increased
scewicz et al. [43] suggest that low qualities may disappear as a result of trade, 
increasing the average quality of goods in the market. Motta and Thisse [97] 
suggest that integration may lead to deindustrialisation and welfare losses in pe­
ripheral areas. I would like to use the incomplete contracting framework of chapter
3 to analyse the effect of economic integration on the quality level of the goods
produced internationally? Will investment in R&D increase as hold-up reduces? 
Or will strategic motivations induce a divergence in the quality levels of goods 
produced internationally?
5Internalisation has already been modeled as an endogenous response to market 
failure by for instance Ethier [39], and Horstmann and Markusen [60, 58]. Also 
relevant is Smith [117].
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the attractiveness of FDI relative to alternatives such as outsourcing and 
trade. What may be the incentives for a firm to own the separate stage of 
production? How does the outcome compare to a licensing agreement with 
an independent foreign firm? In what ways is vertical disintegration fostered 
and propelled by present international economic trends?
Having scrutinised the links between technological change and globalisa­
tion, I would eventually like to explore whether incorporating these interac­
tions provides a less eclectic framework for evaluating the relative importance 
of technological change and globalisation in explaining recent labour market 
trends. As outlined above, I intend to build on various areas of economic 
research. I hope that this will be an interesting contribution to a literature 
where researchers in international economics, labour economics and indus­
trial organisation have often failed to cooperate.
121
Bibliography
[1] Balassa, B. (1966) ‘Tariff Reduction and Trade in Manufactures among 
the Industrial Countries’, American Economic Review, 56, 466-73.
[2] Berman, E., Bound, J. and Grilliches, Z. (1994) ‘Changes in the Demand 
for Skilled Labour Within US Manufacturing Industries: Evidence from 
the Annual Survey of Manufacturing’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
109, 367-97.
[3] Berndt, E.R., Friedlaender, A.F. and Chiang, J.S.-E.W. (1990) ‘Interde­
pendent Pricing and Markup Behaviour: An Empirical Analysis of GM, 
Ford and Chrysler’, NBER Working Paper 3396.
[4] Bhagwati, J.N. (1965) ‘On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas’, in 
Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments, Baldwin, R.E. et al. (Eds.). 
Chicago: RandMcNallly.
[5] Bhagwati, J.N. (1971) ‘The Generalised Theory of Distortions and Wel­
fare’, in Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth: Papers in Interna­
tional Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger, Bhagwati, J.N., 
Jones, R.W., Mundell, R.A. and Vanek, J. (Eds.). Amsterdam: North- 
Holland Publishing Company.
[6] Bhagwati, J.N. (1988) ‘Export-Promoting Trade Strategy: Issues and 
Evidence’, The World Bank Research Observer, 3, 27-57.
122
[7] Bhagwati, J.N. and Dehejia, V.H. (1994) ‘Freer Trade and Wages of 
the Unskilled: Is Marx Striking Again?’ in Trade and Wages: Leveling 
Wages Down? Bhagwati, J. and Kosters, M.H. (Eds.) Washington: AEI 
Press.
[8] Bhagwati, J.N. and Srinivasan, T.N. (1971) ‘The Theory of Wage Dif­
ferentials: Production Response and Factor Price Equalisation’, Journal 
of International Economics, 19-35.
[9] Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A. and Wolinsky, A. (1986) ‘The Nash Bar­
gaining Solution in Economic Modeling’, Rand Journal of Economics, 
17, 176-88.
[10] Blomstrom, M. (1986) ‘Foreign Investment and Productive Efficiency: 
The Case of Mexico’, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 35, pp.97- 
110 .
[11] Blomstrom, M. and Wolff, E.N. (1989) ‘Multinational Corporations and 
Productivity Convergence in Mexico’, NBER Working Paper 3141.
[12] Bolton, P. and Whinston, M. (1993) ‘Incomplete Contracts, Vertical 
Integration, and Supply Assurance’, Review of Economic Studies, 60, 
121-48.
[13] Booth, A.L. (1995) The Economics of the Trade Union. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
[14] Borjas, G., Freeman, R.B. and Katz, L.F. (1991) ‘On the Labour Market 
Effects of Immigration and Trade’, NBER Working Paper 3761.
[15] Borjas, G.J. and Ramey, V.A. (1994) ‘The Relationship between Wage 
Inequality and International Trade’, in The Changing Distribution of 
Income in an Open US Economy, Bergstrand, J.H. et al. (Eds.). Ams­
terdam: North-Holland.
123
[16] Borjas, G.J. and Ramey, V.A. (1995) ‘Foreign Competition, Market 
Power and Wage Inequality’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1075-110.
[17] Brander, J.A (1981), ‘Intra-industry Trade in Identical Commodities’, 
Journal of International Economics, 11, 1-14.
[18] Brander, J.A. and Krugman, P.R. (1983), ‘A “Reciprocal Dumping” 
Model of International Trade’, Journal of International Economics, 15, 
313-21.
[19] Brander, J.A. and Spencer, B.J. (1988) ‘Unionised Oligopoly and Inter­
national Trade Policy’, Journal of International Economics, 24, 217-34.
[20] Calvo, G.A. (1978) ‘Urban Unemployment and Wage Determination in 
LDC’s: Trade Unions in the Harris-Todaro Model’, International Eco­
nomic Review, 19, 65-81.
[21] Carlin, W. and Soskice, D. (1990) Macroeconomics and the Wage Bar­
gain: A Modem Approach to Employment, Inflation and the Exchange 
Rate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[22] Caves, R.E. (1974) ‘International Trade, International Investment and 
Imperfect Markets’, Special Papers in International Economics, No. 10, 
International Finance Section, Princeton University.
[23] Caves, D.W., Christensen, L.R. and Trethaway, M.W. (1984) ‘Eco­
nomics of Density Versus Economics of Scale: Why Trunk and Local 
Airline Costs Differ?’, Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 4, 471-89.
[24] Caves, D.W., Christensen, L.R., Trethaway, M.W. and Windle, R. 
(1984) ‘Network Effects and the Measurement of Returns to Scale and 
Density for US Railroads’, in Analytical Studies in Transport Economics, 
Daughety, A.F. (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
124
[25] Christensen, L., Jorgenson, D.W. and Lau, L.J. (1973) ‘Transcenden­
tal Logarithmic Production Frontiers’, The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 55, 1, pp.28-45.
[26] Chung, J.W. (1994) Production and Utility Functions: Theory and Ap­
plications. Oxford: Blackwell.
[27] Clemenz, G. (1995) ‘Adverse Selection in Labour Markets and Interna­
tional Trade’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97, 73-88.
[28] Danthine, J.P. and Hunt, J. (1994) ‘Wage Bargaining Structure, Em­
ployment and Economic Integration’, Economic Journal, 104, 528-41.
[29] Dertouzos, J.N. and Pencavel, J.H. (1981) ‘Wage and Employment De­
termination under Trade Unionism: The International Typographical 
Union’, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 1162-81.
[30] Dixit, A.K. and Norman, V. (1980) Theory of International Trade. Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
[31] Dixit, A.K. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1977) ‘Monopolistic Competition and 
Optimum Product Diversity’, American Economic Review, 67, 297-308.
[32] Domowitz, I., Hubbard, R.G. and Petersen, B.C. (1988) ‘Market Struc­
ture and Cyclical Fluctuations in US Manufacturing’, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 70, 55-66.
[33] Driffill, J. and van der Ploeg, F. (1993) ‘Monopoly Unions and the Lib­
eralisation of International Trade’, The Economic Journal, 103, 379-85.
[34] Driffill, J. and van der Ploeg, F. (1995) ‘Trade Liberalisation with Imper­
fect Competition in Goods and Labour Markets’, Scandinavian Journal 
of Economics, 97, 223-43.
125
[35] Dunning, J.H. (1981) International Production and the Multinational 
Enterprise. London: George Allen and Unwin.
[36] Ethier, W. J. (1979) ‘Internationally Decreasing Costs and World Trade’, 
Journal of International Economics, 9, 1-24.
[37] Ethier, W. J. (1982) ‘Decreasing Costs in International Trade and Frank 
Graham’s Argument for Protection’, Econometrica, 50, 1243-68.
[38] Ethier, W.J. (1982a) ‘National and International Returns to Scale in the 
Modern Theory of International Trade’, American Economic Review, 72, 
389-405.
[39] Ethier, W.J. (1986) ‘The Multinational Firm’, Quarterly Journal of Eco­
nomics, 101, 805-33.
[40] Farrell, J. and Gallini, N. (1988) ‘Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: 
Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition’, Quarterly Journal of Eco­
nomics, 673-94.
[41] Feenstra, R.C. (1996) ‘Estimating the Effects of Trade Policy’, in Hand­
book of International Economics, Vol. Ill, Grossman, G. and Rogoff, K. 
(Eds.). Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishers. Forthcoming.
[42] Flaig, G. and Steiner, V. (1990) ‘Markup Differentials, Cost Flexibility 
and Capacity Utilisation in West German Manufacturing’, Augsburg 
University, Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionreiche, No. 40.
[43] Gabszewicz, J.J., Shaked, A., Sutton, J. and Thisse, J.-F. (1981), ‘In­
ternational Trade in Differentiated Products’, International Economic 
Review, 22, 527-35.
[44] Grossman, G. M. (1984) ‘International Competition and the Unionised 
Sector’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 17, 541-56.
126
[45] Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Owner­
ship: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 94, 691-719.
[46] Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1989), ‘Product Development and In­
ternational Trade’, Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1261-83.
[47] Grout, P. (1984), ‘Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding 
Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach’, Econometrica, 52, 449-60.
[48] Grubel, H.G. and Lloyd, P.J. (1974) Intra-Industry Trade: The The­
ory and Measurement of International Trade in Differentiated Products. 
London: Macmillan.
[49] Haberler, G. (1950) ‘Some Problems in the Pure Theory of International 
Trade’, Economic Journal, 60, 223-40.
[50] Hall, R.R. (1988) ‘The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in US 
Industry’, Journal of Political Economy, 96, 921-47.
[51] Harris, J.R. and Todaro, M.P. (1970) ‘Migration, Unemployment and 
Development: A Two-Sector Analysis’, American Economic Review, 60, 
126-42.
[52] Harrison, A.E. (1994) ‘Productivity, Imperfect Competition and Trade 
Reform: Theory and Evidence’, Journal of International Economics, 36, 
53-73.
[53] Hart, O.D. and Holmstrom, B.R. (1987), ‘The Theory of Contracts’, 
in Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress of the Econo­
metric Society, Bewley, T.F. (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
127
[54] Hart, O.D. and Moore, J. (1990) ‘Property Rights and the Nature of 
the Firm’, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1119-58.
[55] Hart, O.D. and Tirole, J. (1990), ‘Vertical Integration and Market Fore­
closure’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 205- 
286.
[56] Helpman, E. (1981) ‘International Trade in the Presence of Product 
Differentiation, Economies of Scale, and Monopolistic Competition: 
A Chamberlinian-Heckscher-Ohlin Approach’, Journal of International 
Economics, 11, 305-40.
[57] Helpman, E. and Krugman, P.R. (1985) Market Structure and Foreign 
Trade: Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition and the International 
Economy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
[58] Horstmann, I.J. and Markusen, J.R. (1987) ‘Licensing versus Direct 
Investment: A Model of Internalisation by the Multinational Enterprise’, 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 20, 464-81.
[59] Horstmann, I.J. and Markusen, J.R. (1992) ‘Endogenous Market Struc­
tures in International Trade (Natura Facit Saltum)’, Journal of Inter­
national Economics, 32, 109-29.
[60] Horstmann, I.J. and Markusen, J.R. (1995) ‘Exploring new markets: 
Direct Investment, Contractual Relations and the Multinational Enter­
prise’, NBER Working Paper 5029.
[61] Holmstrom, B.R. and Tirole, J. (1989) ‘The Theory of the Firm’, in The 
Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Schmalensee, R. and Willig. R.D. 
(Eds.). Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishers.
[62] Huizinga, H. (1993) ‘International Market Integration and Union Bar­
gaining’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 95, 249-55.
128
[63] Jones, R.W. and Neary, J.P. (1984) ‘The Positive Theory of Interna­
tional Trade’, in Handbook of International Economics, Vol. I, Jones, 
R.W. and Kenen, P.B. (Eds.). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers.
[64] Karp, L. and Sioli, L. (1995) ‘Vertically Related Markets and Trade 
Policy in a Bargaining Framework’, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1175.
[65] Katz, L.F. and Summers, L.H. (1989) ‘Industry Rents: Evidence and 
Implications’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 
209-290.
[66] Kemp, M. and Negishi, T. (1970) ‘Variable Returns to Scale, Commod­
ity Taxes, Factor Market Distortions, and their Implications for Trade 
Gains’, Swedish Journal of Economics, 72, 1-11.
[67] Kenwood, A.G. and Lougheed, A.L. (1992) The Growth of the Inter­
national Economy 1820-1990: An Introductory Text. 3rd ed., London: 
Routledge.
[68] King, T. (1970) Mexico: Industrialisation and Trade Policies since 1940. 
London: Oxford University Press.
[69] Klein, B., Crawford, R. and Alchian, A. (1978) ‘Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process’, Journal 
of Law and Economics, 21, 297-326.
[70] Konings, J. and Vandenbussche, H. (1995) ‘The Effect of Foreign Com­
petition on UK Employment and Wages: Evidence from Firm-Level 
Panel Data’, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 131, 655-72.
[71] Krugman, P.R. (1979), ‘Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, 
and International Trade’, Journal of International Economics, 9, 469-79.
129
[72] Krugman, P.R. (1980) ‘Scale Economies, Product Differentiation and 
the Pattern of Trade’, American Economic Review, 70, 950-59.
[73] Krugman, P.R. (1981) ‘Intra-Industry Specialisation and the Gains from 
Trade’, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 959-973.
[74] Krugman, P.R. (1994) ‘Increasing Returns and the Theory of Interna­
tional Trade’, in Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, 
Bewley, T.F. (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[75] Krugman, P.R. (1995) ‘Growing World Trade: Causes and Conse­
quences’, Brookings Papers of Economic Activity: Microeconomics, I, 
25th Anniversary Issue, 327-77.
[76] Krugman, P.R. and Lawrence, R. (1993) ‘Trade, Jobs and Wages’, 
NBER Working Paper 4478.
[77] Kuhn, T.S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press.
[78] Lancaster, K. (1980) ‘Intra-Industry Trade under Perfect Monopolistic 
Competition’, Journal of International Economics, 10, 151-75.
[79] Lawrence, R.Z. and Slaughter, M.J. (1993) ‘International Trade and 
American Wages in the 1980s: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?’, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 161-226.
[80] Layard, R. and Nickell, S. (1990) ‘Is Unemployment lower if Unions 
Bargain over Employment?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 773- 
87.
[81] Layard, R., Nickell, S. and Jackman, R. (1991) Unemployment: Macroe­
conomic Performance and the Labour Market. Oxford: Oxford Univer­
sity Press.
130
[82] Learner, E.E. (1993) ‘Wage Effects of a US-Mexican Free Trade Agree­
ment’, in The Mexico-US Free Trade Agreement, Garber, P.M. (Ed.). 
Cambridge: MIT Press.
[83] Learner, E.E. (1994) ‘Trade, Wages and Revolving Door Ideas’, NBER 
Working Paper 4716.
[84] Levinsohn, J. (1993) ‘Testing the Imports-as-Market-Discipline Hypoth­
esis’, Journal of International Economics, 35, 1-22.
[85] Lindbeck, A. (1993) Unemployment and Macroeconomics. Cambridge: 
MIT Press.
[86] Magee, S.P. (1969) Factor Market Distortions and the Pure Theory 
of International Trade. PhD Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute for 
Technology.
[87] Magee, S.P. (1971) ‘Factor Market Distortions, Production, Distribu­
tion and the Pure Theory of International Trade’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 85, 623-43.
[88] Magee, S. (1973) ‘Factor Market Distortions, Production and Trade: A 
Survey’, Oxford Economic Papers, 25, 1-43.
[89] Manning, A. (1987) ‘An Integration of Trade Union Models in a Sequen­
tial Bargaining Framework’, Economic Journal, 97, 121-39.
[90] Markusen, J.R. (1981) ‘Trade and the Gains from Trade with Imperfect 
Competition’, Journal of International Economics, 11, 531-51.
[91] Markusen, J.R. and Melvin, J.R. (1981) ‘Trade, Factor Prices and the 
Gains from Trade with Increasing Returns to Scale’, Canadian Journal 
of Economics, 14, 450-69.
131
[92] Matthews, R.C.O. (1949) ‘Reciprocal Demand and Increasing Returns’, 
Review of Economic Studies, 37, 149-58.
[93] Melo, J. de and Urata, S. (1986) ‘The Influence of Increased Foreign 
Competition on Industrial Concentration and Profitability’, Interna­
tional Journal of Industrial Organisation, 4, 287-304.
[94] Melvin, J.R. (1969) ‘Increasing Returns to Scale as a Determinant of 
Trade’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 3, 389-402.
[95] Menil, G. de (1971) Bargaining: Monopoly Power versus Union Power. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.
[96] Mezzetti, C. and Dinopoulos, E. (1991) ‘Domestic Unionisation and Im­
port Competition’, Journal of International Economics, 31, 79-100.
[97] Motta, M. and Thisse, J-F. (1993) ‘Deindustrialisation as a Consequence 
of Market Integration’, paper presented at the conference The Location 
of Economic Activity: New Theories and Evidence. Vigo, Spain.
[98] Murphy, K.M. and Welch, F. (1991) ‘The Role of International Trade 
in Wage Differentials’, in Workers and their Wages: Changing Patterns 
in the United States, Kosters, M.H. (Ed.). Washington: AEI Press.
[99] Myint, H. (1958) ‘The Classical Theory of International Trade and the 
Underdeveloped Countries’, Economic Journal, 68, 317-37.
[100] Naylor, R. (1994) ‘International Trade and Economic Integration when 
Labour Markets are Generally Unionised’, Mimeo, Department of Eco­
nomics, University of Warwick.
[101] Neary, J.P. (1978) ‘Dynamic Stability and the Theory of Factor Market 
Distortions’, American Economic Review , 68, 671-82.
132
[102] Nickell, S. and Bell, B. (1995) ‘The Collapse in Demand for the Un­
skilled and Unemployment across the OECD’, Oxford Review of Eco­
nomic Policy, 11, 40-62.
[103] Nickell, S., Vainiomaki, J. and Wadhwani, S. (1994) ‘Wages and Prod­
uct Market Power’, Economica, 61, 457-73.
[104] Nishimizu, M. and Page, J.M. (1990) ‘Trade Policy, Market Orienta­
tion, and Productivity Change in Industry’, in Trade Theory and Eco­
nomic Reform: North, South and East, Melo, J. de and Sapir, A. (Eds.). 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
[105] Ohlin, B. (1933) Interregional and International Trade, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.
[106] Osborne, M.J. and Rubinstein, A. (1990), Bargaining and Markets. San 
Diego: Academic Press.
[107] Pack, H. (1988) ‘Industrialisation and Trade’, in Handbook of Develop­
ment Economics, Chenery, H. and Srinivasan, T.N. (Eds.). Amsterdam: 
North-Holland Publishers.
[108] Reynolds, C. (1970) The Mexican Economy: Twentieth Century Struc­
ture and Growth. New Haven: Yale University Press.
[109] Ricardo, D. (1953) Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 
Sraffa, P. (Ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[110] Rivera-Batiz, L.A. and Romer, P. (1991), ‘Economic Integration and 
Endogenous Growth’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 531-55.
[111] Rosen, S. (1969) ‘Trade Union Power, Threat Effects and the Extent 
of Organisation’, Review of Economic Studies, 36, 185-96.
133
112] Rubinstein, A. (1982) ‘Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model’, 
Econometrica, 50, 97-109.
113] Sachs, J.D. and Shatz, H.J. (1994) ‘Trade and Jobs in US Manufactur­
ing’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1-84.
114] Scammell, W.M. (1980) The International Economy since 1945. Lon­
don: Macmillan Publishers.
115] Schmalensee, R. (1989) ‘Interindustry Studies of Structure and Perfor­
mance’, in Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Vol. II, Schmalensee, 
R. and Willig, R.D. (Eds.). Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers.
116] Smirlock, M. and Marshall W. (1983) ‘Monopoly Power and Expense- 
Preference Behaviour: Theory and Evidence to the Contrary’, Bell Jour­
nal of Economics, 14, 166-78.
117] Smith, A. (1987) ‘Strategic Investment, Multinational Corporations 
and Trade Policy’, European Economic Review, 31, 89-96.
118] Smith, A. and Venables, A.J. (1988) ‘Completing the Internal Market 
in the European Community’, European Economic Review, 32, 1501-25.
119] Sprensen, J.R. (1994) ‘Market Integration and Imperfect Competition 
in Labour and Product Markets’, Open Economies Review, 5, 115-30.
120] Spence, A.M. (1976) ‘Product Selection, Fixed Costs and Monopolistic 
Competition’, Review of Economic Studies, 43, 217-36.
121] Spencer, B.J. and Jones, R.W. (1991) ‘Vertical Foreclosure and Inter­
national Trade Policy’, Review of Economic Studies, 58, 153-70.
122] Spencer, B.J. and Jones, R.W. (1992) ‘Trade and Protection in Verti­
cally Related Markets’, Journal of International Economics, 32, 31-55.
134
[123] Spengler, J. (1950) ‘Vertical Integration and Anti-Trust Policy’, Jour­
nal of Political Economy, 58, 347-52.
[124] Stewart, M.B. (1990) ‘Union Wage Differentials, Product Market In­
fluences and the Division of Rents’, Economic Journal, 100, 1122-37.
[125] Thweatt, W.O. (1976) ‘James Mill and the Early Development of Com­
parative Advantage’, HOPE, 207-34.
[126] Tybout, J.R. (1992) ‘Making Noisy Data Sing: Estimating Production 
Technologies in Developing Countries’, Journal of Econometrics, 53, 25- 
44.
[127] Tybout, J.R. (1992a) ‘Linking Trade and Productivity: New Research 
Directions’, The World Bank Economic Review, 6, 189-211.
[128] Tybout, J.R., Melo, J. de and Corbo, V. (1991) ‘The Effects of Trade 
Reforms on Scale and Technical Efficiency: New Evidence from Chile’, 
Journal of International Economics, 31, 231-50.
[129] Tybout, J.R. and Westbrook, M.D. (1993) ‘Trade Liberalisation and 
the Dimensions of Efficiency Change in Mexican Manufacturing Indus­
tries’, Journal of International Economics, 39, 53-78.
[130] Venables, A.J. (1990) ‘International Capacity Choice and National 
Market Games’, Journal of International Economics, 29, 23-42.
[131] Venables, A.J. and van Wijnbergen, S. (1993) ‘Location Choice, Market 
Structure and Barriers to Trade: Foreign Investment and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement’, Centre for Economic Performance 
Discussion Paper 177.
[132] Verdoorn, P.J. (1960) ‘The Intra-Block Trade of Benelux’, in Economic 
Consequences of the Size of Nations, Robinson, E.A.G. (Ed.). London: 
Macmillan.
135
[133] Wes, M. (1996) Globalisation: Winners and Losers. Institute for Public 
Policy Research: Commission on Public Policy and British Business. 
Discussion Paper 3.
[134] Williamson, O. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and An­
titrust implications, New York: Free Press.
[135] Wood, A. (1994) North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: 
Changing Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[136] Zhao, L. (1995) ‘Cross-Hauling Direct Foreign Investment and Union­
ised Oligopoly’, European Economic Review, 39, 1237-53.
136
